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This study investigated teachers’ perceptions of a teacher performance-pay initiative. 
Despite implementing a performance pay initiative at the beginning of the 2015-16 
school year, the target school district had not investigated teachers’ perceptions of the 
initiative. The researcher included a convenience sample of 54 teachers who worked at a 
Title 1 elementary school located in the southeastern United States.  
 
This applied dissertation used a descriptive survey research design. The researcher found 
Pre-K, kindergarten, and Grade 1 teachers were slightly more supportive of performance 
pay initiatives than Grade 2, Grade 3, Grade 4, and Grade 5 teachers (TPPP difference of 
0.17 between the two groups); however, the difference between the two groups was not 
significant and the effect size was small. The researcher also found that non-tenure teachers 
were slightly more supportive of performance pay initiatives than tenured teachers (TPPP 
difference of 0.10 between the two groups); however, the difference between the groups 
was not statistically significant. Further analysis of the findings revealed a negative 
correlation between years of teaching experience and perceptions of performance pay as the 
number of teaching years increased teachers’ perceptions of performance pay decreased.  
 
The use of convenience sampling procedures and the data collection and analysis 
procedures were limitations. Future research should replicate this study in other settings 
across the target state and use random sampling procedures. Future research should also use 
a qualitative approach as a methodology to investigate teachers’ perceptions of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 
 Effective teaching is a critical component in improving student achievement (M. 
Jones, 2013; Vacca, 2016; Yuan et al., 2013). Recognizing the profound impact that 
effective teaching has on student achievement, the Florida legislature established the 
Florida School Recognition Program (FSRP) to provide monetary awards to public 
schools as well as charter schools, state university systems, and developmental research 
K-12 schools that received a grade of “A” or improved one letter grade over the previous  
academic year (Florida Department of Education, 2014). For the 2011-14 school years, 
schools in Florida received an overall competency grade of A through F based on their 
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) scores. For the 2016 school year, these 
schools received an overall competency grade of A through F based on their Florida 
Standards Assessment (FSA) scores (Florida Department of Education, 2016). 
The topic. The No Child Left Behind Act, The Florida Student Recognition 
Program, Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) and Florida’s Race to the Top initiatives 
are national and statewide school reforms that have evolved in response to an increase in 
public and government demand for more accountability in schools (Carlon, 2015; Yuan 
et al., 2013). Each of these reforms has provided a performance or merit-based financial 
incentive for school employees that states have adopted (Jones, 2013; Rice, Malen, 
Jackson, & Hoyer, 2015; Yuan et al., 2013). These incentive plans compensate teachers 
based on their demonstrated ability to improve students’ standardized test scores, and 
researchers found these incentive plans prompted considerable debate among education 




Background and Justification 
Although the state of Florida has allocated millions of dollars to implement 
teacher performance pay, the statute creating the Florida School Recognition Program 
(FSRP) initiative did not include a provision for evaluating either its effectiveness or the 
effectiveness of teacher performance (Florida Department of Education, 2008). Prior to 
implementing performance pay in public schools, the state of Florida assigned a 
competency letter grade to schools based on their FCAT and FSA scores. To be eligible 
for the FSRP initiative, schools must meet their state-projected Annual Measurable 
Objectives (AMOs), which replaced the Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) measurement 
(Pressley, 2015). Each school has state-projected AMOs which translate into the assigned 
competency letter grade. Schools that meet their designated AMOs each year receive 
financial incentives (Laliberte, 2015)). During the 2014-2015 school year, schools across 
the state of Florida factored in students’ learning gains on statewide exams into the 
teacher’s value-added model (VAM) overall score. 
The state of Florida established the FSRP to provide financial awards to K-12 
public and charter schools and publicly funded developmental research K-12 schools that 
received a grade of A or made a year-over-year improvement of at least one letter grade 
under Florida’s A++ plan (Laliberte, 2015). Despite earmarking millions of dollars to 
implement teacher performance pay, the FSRP initiative did not include a provision for 
determining the effectiveness of either FSRP or Florida’s K-12 teachers (Florida 
Department of Education, 2008). Prior to implementing FSRP in its public schools, the 
state of Florida assigned a competency letter grade to schools based on their students’ 




received (Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber, & Figlio, 2013). To be eligible for the FSRP 
initiative, schools must meet their state-projected Annual Measurable Objectives 
(AMOs). The AMOs replaced the adequate yearly progress measurement associated with 
NCLB. Each school has state-projected AMOs that correspond to an assigned 
competency letter grade, with A representing the highest grade a school can receive and F 
representing the lowest. School meeting their designated annual AMOs receive financial 
incentives (Cocke, 2014). 
The research problem. The problem was that despite implementing teacher 
performance pay in 2015, the target school district had not investigated teachers’ 
perceptions of the teacher performance pay initiative (Francilus, 2015). According to the 
Assessment, Research, and Data Analysis Division (2014) for the target school district, 
the target elementary school’s FCAT English and math scores decreased from 567 in 
2012 to 513 in 2013. In 2014, another decrease occurred as the target school’s FCAT 
English and mathematics score was 504 (Assessment, Research, and Data Analysis 
Division, 2014). In 2014, the state of Florida stopped administering the FCATs and 
piloted the FSA. In 2015, the target school’s FSA English and mathematics scores were 
388. In the summer of 2015, the target school implemented a teacher performance pay 
incentive (Francilus, 2015). Determining teachers’ perceptions of the teacher 
performance pay initiative may have provided a foundation for conducting further 
research. 
The target elementary school received either an “A” or a “B” during those five 
school years. For the years in which the target school received an A, the target school’s 




determine an equitable distribution of the financial award. The committee recommended 
that the target school’s teachers receive 100% of the award money. This allocation of 
award money to teachers represented a form of performance pay. Proponents of 
performance pay argue that incentivizing teacher pay will improve not only teacher 
quality but also student achievement (Marsh, 2014). 
Value-added model. Prior to the FSRP initiative, principals were primarily 
responsible for evaluating and observing Florida teachers, and they did not use students’ 
FCAT scores to determine teachers’ performance. Beginning in 2011, Florida’s 
legislature passed the Student Success Act (SSA), also referred to as Senate Bill 736, 
mandating that schools base at least 50% of educators’ evaluations on students’ 
performance on state standardized tests (Harrison & Cohen-Vogel, 2012; Vacca, 2016). 
In response to this mandate, the state of Florida developed a Value Added Model (Cocke, 
2014), which is a statistical model that determines the extent to which teachers affect 
student learning by determining the difference between students’ predicted scores at the 
beginning of the school year and their actual FCAT scores at the end of the school year 
(Haertel, 2013; Vacca, 2016). One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Value-
Added Model is its ability to measure teacher impact while controlling for 
sociodemographic factors such as income level, race, ethnicity, language, family 
background, and prior educational history (Pivovarova, Amrein-Beardsley, & Broatch, 
2016). 
During the 2016-2017 school year, the VAM ratio was changed to account for 
34% of each teacher’s year-end evaluation while teacher observations and the Deliberate 




the Florida’s SSA in 2011 and Florida’s Race to the Top initiative have linked 
performance pay awards to the overall teacher ratings as determined by the VAM, the 
results of teacher observations, and DGPTs (Vacca, 2016). Under the current teacher 
evaluation model, teachers with a rating of 92.4-100 are highly effective, those with a 
rating of 62.5-92.3 are effective, those with a rating of 50-62.4 need improvement 
(developing if they are in their first three years of teaching), and those with a rating 
below 50 are unsatisfactory. The target elementary school teachers understand their 
students’ FSA scores significantly impact their final performance evaluation and have 
expressed their concerns regarding the development of the VAM and its relationship to 
their students’ FCAT and FSA scores. One teacher at the target school was concerned 
about the amount of performance pay she would receive if her students’ test scores 
accounted for 50% of yearly evaluation. She expressed concern that many of her students 
lacked the ability to be successful on the FSA (M. Mejia, personal communication, April 
4, 2014).  
During the 2017-18 school year, when full implementation occurred, the target 
school’s teachers who received a rating of highly effective received more performance 
pay than the target school’s teachers who received a rating of either effective or 
developing. Although the target district’s school board and the teacher’s union only 
recently negotiated the salary portion of the annual contract, the target school district’s 
leaders believed financial incentives would compel teachers to increase their 
effectiveness. According to Carlon (2015), the resultant goal of teacher performance pay 
is to increase student achievement. Some critics such as Rice et al. (2015) and colleagues 




to increase student achievement. These critics asserted that a performance-based model 
does not consider student factors beyond a teacher’s scope of influence yet profoundly 
impact students’ achievement (Carlon, 2015; Rice et al., 2015). Examples of factors 
outside the scope of a teacher include students’ home lives, cognitive capabilities, and 
socioeconomic status (Yuan et al., 2013).   
Researchers have identified and discussed several logistical issues pertaining to 
the implementation of performance pay for teachers (Marsh, 2014; Pivovarova et al., 
2016; Vacca, 2016; Yuan et al., 2013). Marsh (2014) and Yuan et al. (2013), for example, 
believed using standardized test scores as the primary criteria for determining bonus pay 
was shortsighted because inherent variables such as socioeconomic status and mobility 
impacted student achievement. Pivovarova et al. (2016) discussed VAM’s reliability 
issues in determining teacher effectiveness, noting the VAM did not consider causative 
factors, which resulted in an imprecise measure of teacher effect. Finally, Marsh (2014) 
concluded that a performance-pay plan would promote competition among teachers and 
thereby impact professional collegiality within the school building. 
Deficiencies in the evidence. In an era characterized by increased accountability 
for teachers, Viscardi (2014) found there was limited research investigating teachers’ 
perceptions of performance pay. Marsh (2014) recommended expanding the body of 
knowledge regarding teachers’ perceptions of performance pay by investigating the 
perceptions of teachers who work in urban settings. Stephens (2015) and Viscardi (2014) 
stressed that performance pay initiatives would not succeed unless educational 
policymakers ascertained a precise understanding of the impact of these initiatives on 




investigating urban elementary school teachers’ perceptions of performance pay and  
providing local stakeholders at both the school and district level with a precise 
understanding how performance pay impacts teacher motivation.  
Audience 
 The audience for this applied dissertation was teachers, school- and district-level 
administrators from the target school district as well as state educational policymakers. 
As of 2018, there was a lack of knowledge across the school district regarding teachers’ 
perceptions of performance pay (Robertson-Kraft, 2014). Conducting a study of this 
nature could enable educational stakeholders at both the district- and school-level to 
develop a clear understanding of the extent to which one elementary school’s teachers 
perceived that performance pay impacted their job performance across a range of 
dimensions. Given the amount of money the state earmarks for teacher performance pay, 
state educational policymakers should consider teachers’ perceptions of the state’s 
performance pay initiative. Conducting a study of this nature could prompt the target 
school’s district-level administrators to expand the scope of this study by investigating 
teachers’ perceptions of performance pay across the entire school district. Similarly, 
educational stakeholders could investigate teachers’ perceptions across the state of 
Florida. 
Definition of Terms 
 For this proposed applied dissertation, the following terms were defined to give 
the reader an understanding of the context in which words were used or their usual or 
unrestricted meaning within the context of the study: 




to accept responsibility for their actions. Within the framework of public education, 
accountability is the willingness of public-school districts and their respective schools to 
be held responsible for the delivery of educational services to and the academic 
achievement of their students (K. Jones, 2014). 
Assessment. An assessment is a process wherein educators incorporate various 
methods to assess both student learning and teacher effectiveness. The methods can be 
summative, diagnostic, or formative (Carlon, 2015).  
Expectancy. The construct of expectancy refers to the extent to which individuals 
perceive their efforts will produce the desired results; hence, effort and performance are 
inextricably linked (Vroom, 1964).  
Expectancy Theory. Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory is an outcome-based 
theoretical model that recognizes the inextricable link between the level of effort 
individuals put forth to complete a task and their level of motivation to complete the task 
successfully. Galvanizing this link are the variables of expectancy, instrumentality, and 
valence, which work synergistically to influence individuals’ beliefs that their efforts will 
produce the desired results.    
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test. The FCAT is a standardized test 
administered in the state of Florida to students in grades 3-11. The FCAT consists of 
criterion-referenced items in mathematics, reading, science, and writing. The FCAT 
measures student progress towards the Sunshine State Standards (Florida Department of 
Education, 2012). 
Florida Student Recognition Program. Created by the Florida Legislature in 




high student performance or schools that demonstrate substantial improvement in student 
performance (Florida Department of Education, 2012). 
Incentive pay. Researchers defined incentive pay as a plan to pay teachers based 
on their demonstrated competence in teaching (Pivovarova et al., 2016; Vacca, 2016). 
Throughout this study, the researcher used incentive pay interchangeably with both pay 
for merit and pay for performance.   
Instrumentality. The construct of instrumentality refers to the likelihood that 
individuals believe their rewards are commensurate with their performance (Parijat & 
Bagga, 2014). Within education, teachers believe they will receive additional pay or a 
promotion if they successfully complete a task (Marsh, 2014).  
Merit pay. Gius (2013) defined merit pay as an incentive plan wherein teachers 
receive additional pay for meeting performance criteria. 
Motivation Theory. In the context of the teaching profession, motivation theory 
is a framework for understanding the factors influencing teachers’ desire to enter the 
teaching profession and their willingness to remain in their initial teacher position, and 
the extent to which they contribute to their professional growth and the overall teaching 
profession (Han & Yin, 2016). 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB). Signed into law by Congress in 2002, NCLB 
required schools to have highly qualified teacher in the core subjects in every classroom 
and held schools accountable for students’ results, gave states and districts flexibility 
regarding how they spent federal money, required schools to use research-based 
approaches to guide classroom practices, and compelled schools to involve parents in 




communication initiatives (Florida Department of Education, 2012).   
Race to the Top. A significant part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009, the Race to the Top program is a competitive grant program where in the 
U.S. Department of Education rewards states for implementing significant reforms in the 
following areas: (a) enhancing standards and assessments; (b) improving the collection 
and use of data; (c) increasing teacher effectiveness; (d) achieving equity in teacher 
distribution; and, (e) turning around struggling schools (Meier & Rutherford, 2016). 
Valence. The construct of valence is the extent to which individuals desire a goal 
or outcome. Valence is positive when individuals desire to achieve a goal and negative 
when they do not (Vroom, 1964). Valence among teachers is positive when teachers 
value the rewards received for meeting their desired goals (Marsh, 2014).  
Value Added Model. The VAM is a statistical tool school districts use to 
determine the extent to which teacher instruction impacts student learning over the course 
of a particular time period (Pivovarova et al., 2016). 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to investigate teachers’ perceptions of 
a teacher performance-pay initiative. The participants taught at a Title 1 elementary 
school that is part of an urban public-school district in Florida. Despite implementing a 
teacher performance-pay initiative, the target school district had not assessed teachers’ 
perceptions of the initiative (Francilus, 2015). Prior studies conducted in states such as 
Texas, Colorado, and Arizona found teachers had negative perceptions of performance-
pay initiatives that used students’ test scores as the primary criteria for determining 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The literature in this study describes several commonly accepted theoretical 
traditions that support the appropriateness of performance pay. These traditions include 
the relative success of performance pay in other fields will transfer to education; 
performance pay as a key incentive and retainer of quality teachers and an identifier of 
low-quality instructors; performance pay for educators and the affirmative effect on 
student achievement. 
Theoretical Framework  
 The theoretical framework for this quantitative study was Vroom’s (1964) 
expectancy theory. Vroom’s based his theory on the behaviorist belief that employees 
react favorably to carefully calibrated pay incentives (Marsh, 2014). Vroom concluded 
that the prospect of receiving financial rewards motivated employees to improve their job 
performance (Liang & Akiba, 2015). Vroom identified and described three foundational 
variables in his expectancy theory: expectancy, instrumentality, and valence.  Although 
Vroom noted that each variable had a distinct influence on individuals’ motivation and 
performance, he concluded the combined effect of the variables was synergistic 
(Gemeda, 2015). According to Parijat and Bagga (2014), expectancy is individuals’ 
beliefs that their efforts will enable them to attain their desired goals.  Instrumentality is 
the belief that if an individual reaches the performance expectation, he or she will receive 
the reward. Valence refers to the value individuals affix to rewards (Marsh, 2014; Vroom, 
1964).  
 Expectancy. Yuan et al. (2013) defined expectancy as the strength of the 




and the extent to which they perceive their efforts will increase student achievement. 
Expectancy values range from 0 to 1, with 0 being the lowest level of expectancy and 1 
being the highest (Gemeda, 2015; Rice et al., 2015). Educators are unlikely to put forth 
the requisite effort to increase student achievement if they believe they will not be 
rewarded; in contrast, educators are likely to put forth the necessary effort if they believe 
they will receive financial incentives for improving student achievement (Liang & Akiba, 
2015; Parijat & Bagga, 2014). Researchers have noted that teachers who are unlikely to 
put forth the effort have low levels of expectancy while those who are likely to put forth 
the effort have high levels of expectancy (Marsh, 2014; Parijat & Bagga, 2014). Teachers 
exhibiting low levels of expectancy may perceive that factors outside of their locus of 
control negatively impact their ability to improve student achievement; conversely, 
teachers exhibiting high levels of expectancy may be undeterred by factors out of their 
control and perceive they possess the necessary skills to improve student achievement 
(Britton & Propper, 2016).  
Low levels of self-efficacy, a lack of professional resources, and inadequate levels 
of administrative support are contributing factors to low levels of expectancy among 
educators (Yuan et al., 2013). Researchers found school districts could mitigate the 
potential impact of those factors by clearly defining expectations, by providing precise 
and consistent feedback, by valuing the efforts and contributions of teachers, and by 
rewarding teacher when they meet performance expectations (Wells, Combs, & 
Bustamante, 2013; Yuan et al., 2013). Giving teachers opportunities to acquire the 
requisite knowledge and skills they perceive as necessary is a mechanism for promoting 




Instrumentality. The construct of instrumentality is a measure of individuals’ 
belief that their performance will produce their desired outcomes (Rice et al., 2015; Yuan 
et al., 2013). The application of this construct in an educational setting is the extent to 
which teachers believe in their abilities to improve student achievement will result in 
them receiving financial incentives (Parijat & Bagga, 2014; Rice et al., 2015). Lowe 
(2013) stated the instrumentality “reflects the notion that acquiring the knowledge and 
skills valued by the school and positive consequences such as receiving a pay increase or 
seeing an increase in student learning are strongly connected” (p. 17). Similar to 
expectancy, instrumentality values range from 0 to 1, with 0 being the lowest level of 
instrumentality and 1 being the highest (Ozoemena, 2013; Rice et al., 2015). 
Undergirding this construct are the following three factors: (a) transparency throughout 
all phases of the process; (b) an unwavering trust in those who determine who receives 
what; and, (c) a clear understanding of both the standard of performance and the criteria 
by which leadership will determine financial rewards are the factors influencing 
individuals’ level of instrumentality (Lowe, 2013; Yuan et al., 2013).  
 Having a clear understanding of the criteria by which school leadership determine 
teachers’ performance and their potential for receiving financial awards is a strong 
determinant of instrumentality (Forand, 2012; Parijat & Bagga, 2014). Using a reliable 
instrument to measure teacher effectiveness, having instruments that account for factors 
such as children’s socioeconomic status and cognitive abilities, and giving teachers a 
voice in the type of instrument are the hallmarks of a valid and reliable teacher evaluation 
model (Yuan et al., 2013).  Likewise, using a reliable instrument gives credence to the 




must be both valid and reliable as well as take into account all of the factors influencing 
student achievement. Instrumentality may also have a direct effect on the third variable of 
Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory, which is valence. Because multiple outcomes occur 
from either meeting or not meeting the school’s student achievement goals, there is a 
separate instrumentality belief for each outcome, and each outcome must have valence or 
a degree of desirability or undesirability to the teacher (Parijat & Bagga, 2014).  
Valence. In order to be motivated by a reward, a person must perceive the reward 
as highly desirable (Deckers, 2014). Valence refers to whether or not teachers value the 
rewards associated with obtaining a desired goal, which for teachers is to improve 
students’ test scores. An individual can experience varying levels of valence (Deckers, 
2014; Najera, 2017). Najera (2017) stated, “An individual’s perception of valence in 
achievement or task completion is a function or reflection of their own specific needs, 
goals, values, and preferences” (p. 26). If teachers believe their effort will help them 
achieve their desired goal and lead to a particular outcome, which in the case of teachers 
is either higher pay or other tangible rewards, then their motivation will have greater 
valence (Najera, 2017). Olcum and Titrek (2015) described motivation as a synthesis of 
the constructs of valence and expectancy. Deckers (2014) found that valence was a 
predictive factor in an individual’s willingness to select a goal, with rewards that produce 
high levels of valence having a greater likelihood of being selected than those having low 
levels of valence.  
Accountability in Public Education   
In the 1800’s, Horace Mann’s mission was to ensure that every child received a 




public-school movement, Mann based his devotion on a belief of political stability and 
social harmony, both of which were dependent upon education. Approximately 200 years 
later, a free and appropriate public education became not only a necessity but also a 
world-wide expectation. From its development in 1867 as an agency within the 
Department of the Interior, the United States Department of Education (USDOE) has 
continuously advocated for education to be a right of all citizens (Messerli, 1972). 
However, Finnigan and Gross (2007) stressed that the teaching profession has gone 
largely unjudged for student performance because of complexities regarding the teacher 
evaluation process and political agendas.                                                                                         
The No Child Left Behind Act included over 1000 pages of mandates regarding 
teacher accountability, school funding, classroom instruction, and teacher quality. In 
2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was announced by President Barack 
Obama and the Race to the Top Initiative soon followed (Lavania, Cohen-Vogel, & Lang, 
2015). As part of this initiative and as a means to improve students’ test scores and their 
overall achievement, the United States Department of Education encouraged states to 
devise performance plans for teachers (Lavania et al., 2015). The VAM is a mechanism 
for determining teachers’ effect on students’ test scores and their overall academic 
achievement (McCullough, English, Angus, & Gill, 2015).  
School accountability in Florida. The school accountability era officially began 
for the state of Florida with the enactment of the Educational Accountability Act (Florida 
Educational Accountability Act, 1971). The implementation of a Statewide Assessment 
Program (SAP) was an integral component of the Educational Accountability Act of 1971 




legislators the SAP program several times to address school accountability at the 
elementary and secondary levels. Statewide initiatives such as the FSRP reward teachers 
based on the average performance of students in the school (Buddhi, 2007).  
Value-Added Model    
The state of Florida developed Senate Bill (SB) 736 in an effort to improve the 
evaluation process, compensation system, and employment practices for educators. A 
component of this bill was written to revise and create a teacher evaluation system 
wherein 50% of the evaluation included student standardized test data as factors in 
determining teacher performance (Cocke, 2014). State legislators called the revision 
VAM (Guerere, 2013). Sanders developed VAM in 1992 to measure and improve both 
school and teacher performance (Wesson, Potts, & Hill, 2015). Schools used the VAM to 
disseminate data to the public and to appropriate educational stakeholders regarding the 
performance of school districts and their respective schools in the state of Tennessee 
(Owens, 2013). Schools in the state of Tennessee used the VAM as a mechanism to 
measure students’ year-over-year growth and as a component of their teacher evaluation 
model (McCullough et al., 2015). School-level administrators can use the VAM to help 
identify teachers’ areas of strength and weakness and to determine the types of 
professional development teachers need (McCullough et al., 2015; Wesson et al., 2015).  
At the center of the educator accountability movement are the statistical models 
school districts across the United States use to measure teacher performance 
(McCullough et al., 2015; Perry, 2016). While statistical models vary from both district 
to district and state to state, the premise is the same: to hold teachers accountable for 




McCullough et al., 2015). Proponents of the VAM believe it is a reliable measure of 
teacher effectiveness because of its ability to take into account the following factors: (a) 
students’ prior level of achievement, (b) the number of courses within a subject area 
wherein students enroll, (c) students with disabilities (SWD) status, (d) English language 
learners (ELL) status, (e) gifted status, (f) school attendance, (g) school mobility (number 
of transitions), (h) grade retention (measured by difference from the most common age in 
grade), (i) class size, and (j) similarity of the test scores of students enrolled in the same 
class (Ballou & Springer, 2015; Darling-Hammond, 2015). These proponents also believe 
the VAM is a reliable measure for determining performance-based pay because it 
concurrently measures teachers’ effect on students’ academic performance in relation to 
where the students begin and controls for factors such as socioeconomic status, race, 
gender, class size, and school differences (Darling-Hammond, 2015; McCullough et al., 
2015).    
Researchers found there were benefits as well as disadvantages of using statistical 
models such as VAM to determine a teacher’s value-added score (McCullough et al., 
2015; Loeb, 2013; Perry, 2016). Loeb (2013) concluded that the VAM is an effective 
mechanism for improving both student and school achievement and a reliable tool for 
determining performance-based pay for teachers. Conversely, Collins and Amrein-
Beardsley (2014) found varying levels of reliability across VAM models were predictive 
factor of variance in teacher ratings by as much as 50% from one school year to the next 
one. Collins and Amrein-Beardsley also noted that under these conditions, teachers could 
receive a high VAM score one year and a rating of highly effective and a low VAM score 




of developing a valid, reliable, and objective VAM across multiple states and having 
precise criteria for the extent to which students’ test scores impact teachers’ VAM scores 
and consequently their yearly evaluations (Darling-Hammond, 2015; McCullough et al., 
2015; Moss & Haertel, 2016).                              
Value-Added Model: Target District 
At the conclusion of the school year, the target school district’s research 
department publishes a VAM Detail Report wherein the district classifies teachers into 
one of the VAM models (Assessment, Research, and Data Analysis Division, 2014). 
District administrators use the Florida VAM and one of the district’s two VAM models 
when determining core teacher outcomes; however, they use reading and language arts 
assessments and one of the district’s two VAM model assessments when determining 
non-core teacher outcomes (Research Services, Dade County Public Schools, 2017). 
Core Teachers. The Florida VAM determines the teacher outcomes for the 
following: (a) reading and English/language arts (ELA) in grades 4 through 10 on the 
basis of students’ FSA scores, (b) mathematics in grades four through eight using the 
FSA, and (c) Algebra 1 in grades eight and nine using only the end-of-course (EOC) 
assessment (Assessment, Research, and Data Analysis Division, 2014). Additionally, the 
target district administrators  use the district covariance adjustment VAM to determine 
teacher outcomes for the following: (a) reading and mathematics in kindergarten through 
third grade, using the Stanford Achievement Test for kindergarten, first grade, and 
second grade and the FSA for third grade; (b) science in grades five and eight using the 
EOC, (c) civics in grade seven using the EOC, (d) geometry in grades 8 through 10 using 




through 11 using the EOC, and (g) U.S. History in Grade 11 using the EOC and certain 
advanced placement courses and advanced placement exams. Lastly, the target district 
uses the district achievement VAM to determine teacher outcomes for the following: (a) 
other courses using advanced placement, International Baccalaureate, and Advanced 
International Certification Examination; (b) certain courses using industry certification 
exams, and (c) exceptional student education courses using the Florida Standards 
Alternate Assessment.  
Non-Core Teachers. The non-core teachers are those who do not teach a core 
academic subject. These teachers’ scores are based on their schools’ composite scores on 
the following tests:  (a) non-tested courses, (b) the Stanford Achievement Test in reading 
for grades kindergarten through second, (c) the FSA in ELA for grades 3 through 10, and 
(d) one of the following: the College Board Scholastic Aptitude Test, the American 
College Test, or the Post-Secondary Readiness Test for grades 11 and 12. 
Outcomes   
Outcomes are the expectations the Florida Department of Education expects 
teachers to achieve. The outcomes are also the criteria by which school districts 
determine teacher effect. The Florida Department of Education contractor reports teacher 
effect as either a positive or negative value-added score (Assessment, Research, and Data 
Analysis Division, 2014). Within this section, the researcher describes the three VAM 
models: the Florida VAM, the district covariance adjustment VAM, and the district 
achievement VAM.     
Outcomes of the Florida VAM. The Florida Department of Education provides 




Determining the three-year aggregated results for each teacher is a multi-step process 
wherein the Florida Department of Education’s contractor conducts several calculations. 
The first step of the process involves determining the difference between the average 
performance of a teacher’s students and the expected performance of academically and 
demographically comparable students across the state of Florida. The expected 
performance is a measurement of each student’s prior achievement while adjusting for 
certain demographic, academic, and classroom characteristics (Florida Department of 
Education, 2013). The second step involves dividing by the difference in the mean scale 
scores between assessment results in two consecutive academic years for a specific grade 
level and subject area (average amount of academic growth).  
This result can then be interpreted as a percentage of the difference between the 
average student performance and the expected performance makes of the average annual 
amount of academic growth. Finally, these results were aggregated across grade levels, 
subject areas and academic years. If the teacher receives a positive value outcome, then 
the average performance of his or her students exceeded the expected performance of 
academically and demographically comparable students across the state; conversely, if 
the receives a negative value outcome, then the average performance of his or her 
students was below the expected performance of academically and demographically 
comparable students across the state.  
Outcomes of the district covariance adjustment VAM. Similar to the Florida 
VAM, the outcome for the district covariance adjustment VAM is the difference between 
the average performance of a teacher’s students and the expected performance of 




Florida VAM, the expected performance is a measurement of each student’s prior 
achievement while adjusting for certain demographic, academic, and classroom 
characteristic. A positive value indicates the average performance of a teacher’s students 
exceeds the expected performance of academically and demographically similar students 
across the school district whereas a negative value indicates the average performance of a 
teacher’s students is below the expected performance of academically and 
demographically similar students. In contrast to the Florida VAM, outcomes of the 
district covariance adjustment VAM are reported as a scaled score (except for AP 
outcomes where the numbers represent the difference between the percentage of students 
who pass an AP exam [with scores of three to five] and the expected percentage) and the 
formula includes only student assessment data from the previous school year.   
Outcomes of the district achievement VAM. The outcomes of the district 
achievement VAM differ from the previous two models discussed as outcomes are the 
difference between the passing rate of a teacher’s students on all assessments combined 
and the passing rate of the target school district’s students for a particular subject area 
such as mathematics or social science. The school district reports the percentages as 
decimals, with positive values indicating by how many percentage points the passing rate 
of a teacher’s students exceeds the school district’s average passing rate on a subject-area 
assessment and negative values indicating by how many percentage points the passing 
rate of a teacher’s students are below the school district’s average passing rate on a 
subject-area assessment. Similar to the district covariance adjustment VAM, the 
outcomes of the district achievement VAM are based on the student assessment data from 




Benefits of VAMs. Researchers identified several benefits of VAMs across 
multiple school settings (Collins & Amrein-Beardsley, 2014; Darling-Hammond, 2015; 
Loeb, 2013; McCullough et al., 2015). McCullough et al. (2015) noted the dearth of 
empirical research investigating the impact of VAMs on multiple teacher outcomes. 
Hoping to contribute to the overall body of knowledge, McCullough et al. sought to 
determine the impact of VAMs on multiple outcomes among teachers who worked in 
eight Mid-Atlantic school districts. They conducted “interviews with district 
administrators, principals, teachers, and teachers’ union representatives in the eight 
school districts” (p. 3). McCullough et al. found teachers and school- and district-level 
administrators perceived the VAMs were reliable indicators for assessing teacher 
effectiveness and appropriate mechanisms for determining teachers’ eligibility for 
performance-based bonuses.  
Loeb (2013) believed schools could use VAMs to assess the impact of teacher-
based training programs on student achievement across both content areas and grade 
levels. Loeb also concluded that VAMs were effective measures for identifying 
ineffective teachers and those who required specialized professional development. Loeb 
further noted that schools could use VAMs as the criteria by which they either promote or 
fire teachers. Collins and Amrein-Beardsley (2014) concluded that VAMs provide a 
comprehensive perspective of teachers’ effect on students’ achievement over a period of 
years. The VAM is also a mechanism for helping teachers and schools identify what 
content areas require additional time and how educators can improve their pedagogical 
practices and promote student achievement (Darling-Hammond, 2015; Loeb, 2013).  




teacher evaluation because they incorporate multiple years of data and account for 
measurement error, which is referred to as the standard error (Collins & Amrein-
Beardsley, 2014; Jensen, 2011). In essence, the VAM can account for where students are 
at the beginning of the school year and track their growth throughout the school year and 
thereby recognize the extent to which educators promote student achievement and 
schools meet the needs of their students. When schools use VAMs appropriately, they 
can foster collaboration among educators (Darling-Hammond, 2015).  
Standard error. Standard error is the measure of uncertainty in the outcome as a 
result of factors that are outside of the teachers’ scope of control (Doran, 2014). Although 
teachers in the Miami-Dade County School District may be instructing demographically 
and academically similar students in their classrooms, students’ achievement on 
standardized tests can vary based on the test form and even the day of the week. The 
standard error is analogous to the margin of error, which is used when reporting the 
results of polls or elections. Doran (2014) suggested incorporating standard or 
measurement error into the point estimates when formulating the characteristics of 
teacher effect. Point estimates, such as medians or means of growth percentiles, indicate 
the impact on student achievement. Such point estimates are often the basis for ranking 
teachers when using a classification structure (Doran, 2014).  
Issues pertaining to VAMs. Researchers described several issues regarding the 
use of VAMs to determine teacher effectiveness (Amrein-Beardsley, Pivovarova, & 
Geiger, 2016; Rouse et al., 2013; McCullough et al., 2015). Amrein-Beardsley et al. 
(2016) found teachers and administrators lacked a clear understanding of the intricacies 




their pedagogical practices and their students’ achievement. Another issue Amrein-
Beardsley et al. identified was the lack of empirical evidence supporting a relationship 
between any of the indicators associated with the VAM and “at least one concurrent 
measure of teacher effectiveness, such as supervisors observational assessment of 
teachers or students survey-based assessments” (p. 36). Rouse et al. (2013) made a 
similar conclusion regarding the lack of a discernible relationship between the VAM 
indicators and the measures schools used to measure teacher effect and therefore schools 
were not able to evaluate teachers accurately.   
McCullough et al. (2015) identified several issues hindering the implementation 
of VAMs. These challenges included the cost-prohibitive nature of implementing the 
measures across school districts, the lack of evidence to support the reliability and the 
validity of the models, and the inability to ensure adherence to the evaluation model. 
Other challenges related to the implementation of VAM include the inability to account 
for differences in student demographic variables, the lack of support from teachers’ 
unions, the inability to get a precise measure of a teachers’ contributions to students’ 
learning (Amrein-Beardsley et al., 2016; Rouse et al., 2013).  
Other Issues With VAMs 
Researchers identified several constructs that school districts must consider when 
implementing merit pay programs for teachers (Alger, 2014; Dean, 2015; Fulbeck, 2014; 
Yuan et al., 2013). Ritter and Jensen’s (2010) four foundational constructs of 
attainability, transparency, substantiality, and sustainability is the focus of this section. In 
the subsequent section, the researcher describes the constructs and their application in an 




Attainability. The construct of attainability refers to teachers’ beliefs that 
predetermined student benchmarks are achievable (Edenfield, 2014). For merit pay 
programs to motivate teachers and improve student outcomes, teachers must believe the 
reward is attainable (Edenfield, 2014). The degree to which individuals perceive the 
attainability of goals influences their levels of motivation. If individuals believe goals are 
attainable, they are more likely to exhibit high levels of motivation and to persist when 
challenges occur; conversely, if individuals believe goals are unattainable, they are less 
likely to exhibit high levels of motivation and more likely give up when challenges occur 
(Alger, 2014; Yuan et al., 2013).  
When considering the construct of attainability, one of the hurdles many merit-
based programs face is the likelihood of a group of students reaching predetermined 
benchmarks is low (Yuan et al., 2013). Teachers are acutely of the influence factors such 
as socioeconomic status and mobility have on student achievement. Teachers with either 
a disproportionately high percentage of students from low socioeconomic backgrounds or 
a high student mobility rate are less likely to believe their students will meet performance 
benchmarks (Marsh, 2014; Yuan et al., 2013); consequently, they are unlikely to put forth 
the requisite effort to achieve their performance benchmarks. Researchers note that recent 
attempts to account socioeconomic status, student mobility, and other factors beyond the 
scope of a teachers’ control have done little to promote teachers’ belief in their students’ 
ability to meet achievement benchmarks and their willingness to expend the necessary 
energy to improve student achievement (Alger, 2014; Marsh, 2014).  
Transparency. The construct of transparency refers to teachers’ understanding of 




Providing a clear understanding of expectations and the criteria by which schools 
measure a teacher’s effectiveness is paramount (Anderson, Hunt, Powell, & Dollar, 2013; 
Dean, 2015). Dean (2015) defined transparency “as the degree to which a VAM is 
understandable, replicable, or usable by researchers, educators, or the public” (p. 1). For 
teachers to be motivated, they must have a precise understanding of teacher performance 
expectations. These expectations must be a manner that educators believe the merit plan 
is transparent, comprehensible, and systematically efficient. Researchers found involving 
a consensus of teachers at the inception of a performance pay initiative was an effective 
means for promoting personal investment and the long-term sustainability of the initiative 
(Anderson et al., 2013). 
Substantiality. The third foundational construct of Ritter and Jensen’s 2010 is 
substantiality. Researchers stressed the importance of ensuring performance pay rewards 
were substantial enough to assure educators that school districts will compensate them for 
their talents and efforts in both the present and the future (Anderson et al., 2013; 
Edenfield, 2014).  Financial rewards should be commensurate with what educators in 
other states receive. If teachers are to move out of their comfort zone and try innovative, 
research-based strategies, then the reward should outweigh the risks (Anderson et al., 
2013).  
Sustainability. The fourth and final foundational point is the construct of 
sustainability. If merit pay is going to be temporary, then teachers are unlikely to be 
motivated to adapt their instructional practices to improve student achievement. 
Researchers noted the sustainability of merit pay programs may be difficult in times of 




sustainability of their merit-pay programs, Colorado and Arizona earmarked funds for 
teacher incentive pay programs (Fulbeck, 2014).  
Teacher Accountability  
Throughout the course of history, the construct of teacher quality and 
effectiveness in America’s schools has evolved in conjunction with societal norms. 
Similarly, models measuring teacher quality have changed to conform to paradigm shifts 
within society (Gamson & Hodge, 2016). Researchers found the construct of teacher 
evaluation changed in accordance with society’s perceptions regarding the roles and 
responsibilities of educators, the manner in which students acquire knowledge, and the 
changing demographics of America’s schools. One of the most recent models that 
schools systems across the United States have used is VAMs (McCullough et al., 2015). 
Researchers traced the construct of teacher evaluation back to the one-room schoolhouses 
wherein a hierarchical system was prevalent and compliance to procedures superseded 
professional growth (Farley, 2017). Prior to 1850, teacher-evaluation practices were a 
series of intermittent observations wherein evaluators ensured teachers conformed to the 
community’s standards and terminated educators whom they deemed were ineffective 
(Gamson & Hodge, 2016). The evaluations of educators were more closely related to 
religious beliefs and societal norms within the community than to actual educational 
reforms (Farley, 2017; Gamson & Hodge, 2016).     
Through the latter of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the 
teaching profession evolved as did the idea of teacher accountability (Gamson & Hodge, 
2016). It was during this period that male supervisors observed and evaluated teachers 




policymakers held them in high esteem for their expertise regarding pedagogical practice 
and student learning (Gamson & Hodge, 2016). Furthermore, as schools began to grow 
and their curriculum expanded and included various core academic areas, qualified 
educators were in demand, thereby increasing the need for a reliable teacher evaluation 
model and increased accountability for students (Farley, 2017; Gamson & Hodge, 2016).  
 In the middle of the 20th century, schools adopted a checklist-style evaluation and 
school administrators and educators engaged in verbal dialogue concerning the evaluation 
process (Gamson & Hodge, 2016). This paradigm shift prompted researchers to 
investigate the relationship between educator behaviors and student outcomes (Farley, 
2017). The dependence on local and state policy determined when and how often school 
administrators used these checklists to assess teachers; however, teacher evaluation 
became a fundamental component of both school district policy and collective bargaining 
agreements (Farley, 2017).      
As the practice of using checklists increased, the construct of teacher 
accountability emerged and evolved. In the early 1970s, policymakers and educational 
stakeholders acrimoniously debated teacher evaluation policies and accountability (Yuan 
et al., 2013). Eventually, accountability within K-12 education encompassed teacher 
effectiveness, teacher practices, and school-wide success and standardized test scores 
became the primary criteria schools used to evaluate teachers. By the end of the 20th 
century, the link between teacher evaluation results and support services ushered in a new 
era of educator accountability wherein school district leaders felt pressure to use data 
from assessments in the teacher evaluation process and to enact professional development 




meet state and federal mandates while safeguarding the belief that individual educator 
performance measures were reliable and valid (Kane & Staiger, 2012). 
Merit Pay 
Generally restricted to the private sector throughout the majority of the 20th 
century, merit-based pay initiatives emerged in federal employment agencies with the 
passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. By establishing merit-pay guidelines, 
legislators believed they had a mechanism for restoring responsiveness and efficiency 
within the federal sector (Nieberg, Pieper, & Trevor, 2016). The most noteworthy 
components of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 were comprehensive appraisal 
reforms, large cash awards for employees, merit pay and cash awards for specified 
managers, and the establishment of performance incentives for senior executive service 
employees (Nieberg et al., 2016). 
Nieberg et al. (2016) defined merit pay as additional monetary compensation for 
employees who meet previous performance benchmarks. They found merit pay existed 
across various industries and under different compensation structures. Within the field of 
education, teachers receive merit pay for meeting predetermined performance criteria 
(Stephens, 2015). The ability to improve students’ scores on standardized tests is one of 
the most prevalent criteria that must meet to receive merit pay (Gius, 2013; Stephens, 
2015). Other criteria for earning merit pay include degree attainment and years of 
experience (Edenfield, 2014; Gius, 2013).  
Edenfield (2014) investigated the perceptions of one southeastern state’s teachers 
regarding merit pay initiative and found that more than 80% of the teachers opposed 




wherein teachers receive additional compensation for degree attainment and for 
participation in professional growth activities. When Edenfield asked teachers to describe 
their perceptions regarding merit-pay initiatives on the basis of student achievement, 
teachers cited the inability of evaluation models to consider factors beyond their scope of 
influence (socioeconomic status, the extent of parental involvement in schools), the 
disproportionate emphasis on students’ test scores in comparison to other components of 
the evaluation process, and the potential for a negative work environment.  
Stephens (2015) also investigated teachers’ perceptions of merit pay but in a 
different southeastern state. Stephens found teachers’ overall perceptions of merit pay 
were indifferent. Stephens surmised the indifference among teachers regarding merit pay 
could have been the result of them perceiving that merit-pay initiatives aimed at 
improving instructional practices and thereby student achievement were ineffective. The 
other rationale Stephens provided for the indifference among teachers was the merit-pay 
program’s decision to include additional benchmarks during the second year of 
implementation. Other data analysis conducted by Stephens included comparing teachers’ 
perceptions of merit pay based on factors such as years of teaching experience (teachers 
with five or more years or experience vs. those with less than five years’ experience), a 
school’s socioeconomic status (low socioeconomic status vs. high socioeconomic status), 
and type of course (course with standardized test vs. course without a standardized test). 
Stephens found teachers’ perceptions did not differ across the factors of years of teaching 
experience, socioeconomic status of school, and type of course. To improve teachers’ 
perceptions of merit pay programs, Stephens recommended giving teacher input 




to the “the school district mission statement” (p. 93) as doing this would promote 
autonomy among stakeholders and clear rationale for improving student achievement.  
Similar to Stephens (2015) and Edenfield (2014), Russ (2015) sought to 
determine teachers’ perceptions of merit pay; however, Russ investigated the perceptions 
of over 250 teachers from two school districts within one Midwestern state. Russ used a 
quantitative approach and a descriptive design. Teachers completed a Likert-scale survey 
wherein they responded to a series of statements pertaining to various elements of 
teacher-performance models and the extent to which elements such as teacher 
evaluations, standardized test scores, and school- and district-level performance on 
assessments should be part of the criteria for determining merit pay for teachers. Russ 
also determined teacher overall perceptions of merit-pay initiatives. Teachers had 
negative perceptions regarding the use of standardized test scores and student 
performance on school- and district-level performance on assessments as the criteria for 
determining merit pay for teachers. Overall, teachers had negative perceptions of merit-
pay initiatives as they perceived those initiatives were not effective mechanisms for 
rewarding teacher performance and would create a negative work environment.     
In a study conducted in another Midwestern state, Routh (2014) investigated 
teachers’ perceptions of merit-pay initiatives; however, in contrast to Russ’s 2015 study, 
Routh’s 2014 study was broader in scope as Routh included teachers from across the 
entire state. Routh found more than two thirds of the Midwestern state’s teacher had 
negative perceptions regarding the use of administrators’ evaluations as the basis for 
determining merit pay for teachers. Routh also concluded approximately three fourths of 




environment by implementing merit-pay initiatives.   
  Arizona. While various states have changed and modified the criteria by which 
they determine merit pay for teachers, Arizona is one of the only states to have 
permanent, uniform criteria for awarding merit pay. In a 2010 report, the Arizona Auditor 
General found 29 districts that received funding for merit pay for teachers were able to 
associate teacher performance pay to student learning gains (Buck & Greene, 2011).  
At the beginning of the 2014-2015 school year, the state of Arizona passed statute 
ARS 15-977 and earmarked funds for teachers who met measurable achievement 
outcomes (Tucson Unified School District, 2017). ARS 15-977 has the following four 
elements: (a) the adoption of a performance-based compensation system by the governing 
school board during a public hearing, (b) the implementation of a teacher evaluation 
component as determined by the teacher’s performance classification, (c) the use of 
precise instruments to measure students’ progress toward meeting academic standards set 
forth by the Arizona State Board of Education, and (d) the approval of the performance-
based compensation system by at least 70% of a school district’s teachers who are 
eligible to participate in the system (Tucson Unified School District, 2017). Further 
analysis of the teacher evaluation component reveals that 40% percent of the money is 
earmarked for individual teacher performance and a teacher’s performance classification 
accounts for 33% (Tucson Unified School District, 2017). Teachers are also able to earn 
performance-based compensation for earning certification from the National Board for 
Professional Teaching Standards, planning site-based professional development sessions, 
and meeting the requirements of the site-based plan, which consists of two components 




 Colorado. Since 1993, the state of Colorado has been an innovator in 
performance pay systems. Hoping to reform its teacher compensation model, the state of 
Colorado rolled out a new plan at the beginning of the 2010-11 school year (Blazer, 
2011). The new plan was part of Senate Bill 191 (Robles, 2015). Under this plan, schools 
assessed teachers annually using a comprehensive evaluation model that included the 
following components: (a) students’ standardized test scores, (b) administrator 
observations, (c) measurements assessing teachers’ aptitude to develop 21st century 
skills, (d) parent and student evaluations, and (e) the ability to meet yearly program goals 
(Blazer, 2011). Students’ performance on standardized tests accounted for exactly 50% of 
a teacher’s evaluation, and teachers who received positive evaluations were eligible for 
financial incentives; conversely, teachers who did not receive positive evaluations were 
not eligible for either financial incentives or yearly salary increases (Robles, 2015). 
Teacher unions across the state of Colorado vehemently opposed the plan, and since the 
2015-2016 school year, teacher evaluations in Colorado have not included test scores and 
salary increases are based on meeting school performance goals or receiving a 
satisfactory personal evaluation (Robles, 2015).  
Munroe (2017) conducted a study in one large urban Colorado school district 
wherein she compared teachers’ perceptions of merit-based pay. Munroe used an 
experimental design and randomly assigned each participant to one of two groups. Each 
group of participants received a questionnaire that included a distinct speculative 
situation regarding merit pay, a series of Likert-scale items, and three short-answer 
questions. Munroe created Likert-scale items and addressed variables such as 




profession and open-ended questions regarding teachers’ perceptions of merit-based 
compensation. Munroe assessed the first group of teachers’ perceptions of a merit-based 
pay system wherein alternative measures of assessment were the criteria for determining 
student growth and the second group of teachers’ perceptions of a merit-based pay 
system wherein standardized test scores were the criteria for determining student growth. 
Next, Munroe compared the two groups’ perceptions across the following four variables: 
pedagogical practices, school climate, motivation, and commitment to the teaching 
profession.  
Munroe (2017) found teachers perceived higher levels of motivation and 
commitment to the teaching profession under a merit-based pay system that used 
alternative measures to determine student growth than they did under a merit-based pay 
system that used standardized test scores to determine student growth. Munroe also 
analyzed participants’ responses to the open-ended questions and found the recurrent 
theme of “fairness of implementation” emerging from both groups’ data. Teachers 
perceived that schools promoted a fair merit-based pay system when they had uniform 
procedures regarding who assessed teacher performance and accounted for factors 
beyond teachers’ locus of control.  
Bruce Messinger, who is the Superintendent of the Boulder Public Schools, 
questioned the effectiveness of reforms aimed at monetarily reward teachers for 
improving student achievement performance (Robles, 2015). Messinger believed these 
reforms are simple solutions to a multi-faceted problem and making a connection 
between students’ growth on standardized tests and teacher effectiveness is problematic 





Although the new teacher evaluation plan is on hold across most of the school 
systems across the state of Colorado, several school systems have taken the initiative and 
implemented alternative teacher compensation models. Fulbeck (2014) described the 
Denver Public School’s merit pay program “as one of the most prominent alternative 
teacher compensation reforms in the nation” (p. 67). Fulbeck found the ProComp 
program included various financial rewards for teachers who increased their overall 
pedagogical effectiveness as measured by their students’ test scores. Plagued by high 
attrition rates among its teachers, the Denver Public Schools implemented the ProComp 
program in an effort to recruit and to retain effective teachers. To gain a clear 
understanding of ProComp’s impact in the Denver Public schools, Fulbeck compared the 
attrition rates of teachers who received a financial incentive through ProComp and the 
attrition rates of teachers who did not. Fulbeck used a longitudinal design and collected 
attrition data over a nine-year period. Fulbeck found that teachers who received the 
ProComp financial incentive were less likely to leave the Denver Public Schools than 
teachers who did not receive the financial incentive.  
North Carolina. The state of North Carolina has several districts involved in 
teacher compensation programs, with some being successful and others being both 
controversial and unsuccessful. These programs are continuous programs or programs set 
with a time-limit through state or national funding (Blazer, 2011). North Carolina’s ABC 
program is one that was meant to reorganize the district around specific goals. These 
goals were based on a model whereas schools are evaluated based on student 




the following performance ratings to each school: (a) school of excellence, (b) school of 
distinction, (c) school of progress, or (d) low performing school (Blazer, 2011). Although 
the ABC program was discontinued in the 2008-2009 school year due to budget 
restraints, a new budget was approved during the 2012-2013 school year for an 
alternative teacher compensation plan with the most recent teacher-merit pay program in 
effect during the 2014-2015 school year (Lauen & Kozlowski, 2014). 
Additionally, Guilford County Schools, which is the third most populous county 
in North Carolina, has initiated a performance-pay program over the past nine years that 
has been funded by two separate sources. The Mission Possible (MP) was a federally 
funded grant meant to recruit, retain, and reward highly qualified teachers through 
bonuses. While the $8 million federal grant has since expired, the MP is currently funded 
by a $22.8 million U.S. Department of Education Teacher Incentive Fund and due to 
expire in 2015 but deemed successful (Maranto, 2014).  
Unlike Guilford County, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School (CMS) district’s 
performance pay plan was met with controversy. The state funded this plan through a 5-
year grant and instituted the plan in the district’s 20 highest-need schools, with teachers 
receiving additional pay for employing hard-to-staff schools (Blazer, 2011). The 
controversy ensued when public perceptions met with discourse on converting the entire 
state of North Carolina into teacher performance pay zones homogeneously and 
legislation built in to exclude teacher and district approval of the measures. The public’s 
perception was that CMS added two public relations firms to help equalize the response 
as well as a donation given from the Gates Foundation of almost $250,000 to support the 




Tennessee. The state of Tennessee instituted the VAM and called it the 
Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System. In 1995, Chattanooga became the first 
school district to institute an incentive-based pay system in the form of bonus pay for 
teachers who worked in its chronically low-performing schools or taught high-needs 
subject areas (Davis, 2014). Eventually, the state of Tennessee went away from using 
merit-based pay as an incentive for improving student achievement and adopted a 
rigorous teacher-evaluation model that used student achievement data as the primary 
criteria for determining teacher effectiveness (Davis, 2014; Toch, 2016). The state of 
Tennessee made this decision after it received a $500,000,000 as part of the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Race to the Top Initiative (U.S. Department of Education, 
2016). Disillusioned by the teacher-evaluation model’s overemphasis on student 
achievement, teachers across the state of Tennessee voiced their displeasure to local and 
state politicians (Davis, 2014). The most poignant aspects of the teacher-evaluation 
model were the number of times administrators observed teachers each school year and 
the weighted percentage of student growth measures in teachers’ yearly evaluations 
(Davis, 2014; Will, 2018).   
Recently, the state of Tennessee adopted a new program wherein local teachers 
have more autonomy and are able to receive additional compensation for serving as 
instructional and data coaches and curriculum developers (Will, 2018). Tennessee is 
using Title II monies to fund the program (Will, 2018). Under the program, school 
districts must incorporate differentiated pay scales into their salary schedules, provide 
money awards for teachers who receive positive teacher evaluations, and give additional 




schools. Because this is a new program, there is no empirical evidence describing the 
effect of Tennessee’s newer model’s on students’ test scores.  
Texas. In 2008, the state of Texas used a voluntary merit pay program for 
teachers, and approximately close to one-fifth of Texas’s public-school districts 
participated in the program (Blazer, 2011). The state of Texas funded the program 
through initiatives such as the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG) and the 
Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) and teachers from almost 1000 high-
poverty schools that the state designated as high-achieving schools participated in the 
program (Blazer, 2011; Stutz, 2013). In 2011, with funding cuts of over $360 million 
across the state of Texas, the voluntary merit pay program was on the brink of extinction 
(Blazer, 2011). Hoping to fund the program fully when revenue increased, Texas 
maintained a remnant of the voluntary merit pay program through the 2013-2014 school 
year, with a budget that was approximately 6% of the original budget.  
By the conclusion of the 2013-14 school year, the state of Texas to end the 
voluntary merit pay program for teachers to replace it with the Educator Excellence 
Innovation Program (Stutz, 2013). Texas implemented the Educator Excellence 
Innovation Program at the beginning of the 2014-15 school year (Smith, 2018). The 
central aim of the program is to award grant money to schools with a disproportionately 
high percentage of students from low socioeconomic backgrounds and to prepare new 
teachers to be successful in the classroom and to provide veteran teachers with new 
career pathways (Stutz, 2013). During the 2014-15 school year, 40 schools participated in 
the Educator Excellence Innovation Program. As the Educator Excellence Innovation 




implement a comprehensive teacher evaluation model in the midst of statewide budgetary 
constraints. The superintendent of the Dallas Public Schools, Michael Hinojosa, 
underscored the importance of implementing an innovative evaluation system and 
identifying additional resources to fund the program (Smith, 2018). In 2011, the state of 
Texas implemented another merit pay program for teachers titled the District Awards for 
Teacher Excellence (Stutz, 2013). Texas used state revenue to fund the District Awards 
for Teacher Excellence program, and teachers received merit pay for improving students’ 
performance on standardized tests (Stutz, 2013).       
Stutz (2013) investigated the impact that merit pay programs had on students’ 
academic achievement. Stutz compared the achievement gains of students who attended 
Texas public schools with merit pay programs and of students who attended Texas public 
schools without merit pay. Stutz found that students who attended schools with merit pay 
had greater gains in standardized scores than those who attended schools without merit 
pay (Stutz, 2013). 
Florida. In 2010, Florida was one of 12 states that received federal funding 
through a Race to the Top grant (U.S. Department of Education, 2012). The state of 
Florida used the funds from three-year grant to support school districts as they went 
through the modified and revised the teacher evaluation process. Florida earmarked 
almost $350 million of the $700 million in federal funding allocated under the Race to 
the Top grant to the implementation of the first three years of the pay for performance 
system, which span from 2011 to 2014 (U.S. Department of Education, 2012). In addition 
to the Race to the Top Grant, Florida’s governor signed into law the SSA. The SSA 




academic performance (Haertel, 2013). Recently, President Trump backed mandates such 
as the SSA, stressing that it was time for merit pay for teachers (Strauss, 2017).  
Under the SSA, school districts across the state of Florida must base at least 50% 
of teachers’ performance evaluation on students’ learning growth as determined by the 
FSA (Florida Department of Education, 2014). According to the Florida Department of 
Education (2014), school districts use a VAM as the formula to calculate student learning 
growth. Districts are able to choose one of three pre-approved frameworks for their 
teacher evaluation models. After choosing their preferred evaluation model, the 
department of education reviews and approves the evaluation system and monitors the 
implementation process so that school districts are in compliance with the law (Florida 
Department of Education, 2014). As the beginning of 2016-2017 school year, all Florida 
districts implemented a revised teacher evaluation based on the pre-approved models. 
According to the latest census figures, Florida has 190,000 teachers working in 
over 4,200 public schools and the fourth largest student population in the United States 
with more than 2.6 million public school students (Florida Department of Education, 
2013). When the state of Florida passes new education legislation, teachers across the 
state are impacted. The recent passage of the SSA had a profound effect on new teachers 
across the state of Florida. The effect on new teachers was so profound that the Florida 
Education Association (FEA) filed a lawsuit against the state challenging the 
constitutionality of the new law and the new teacher evaluation system (O’Connor, 
2013). The 2013 case of Cook et al, v. Pam Stewart, Florida Commissioner of Education, 
et al., called into question the equal protection rights of teachers whose evaluations were 




did not teach (O’Connor, 2013). In 2014, the district courts ruled that there was a rational 
basis for Florida public schools to adopt policies requiring schools to base teacher 
evaluations on students’ test scores, even when they did not teach either those students or 
those subject areas (Bauries, Sutherland, & Legare, 2014).  
One of the most noteworthy controversies regarding teacher performance pay in 
Florida is the overarching purpose of the SSA: to increase student achievement (Postal, 
2017). However, six years after the state signed the Students Success Act into law and the 
state’s school districts implemented a teacher merit-pay model, there is limited evidence 
that student achievement has increased (Postal, 2017). Since the Florida Legislature 
signed the SSA into law, there has been no consistent improvement in student 
achievement (Carruthers, Figlio, & Sass, 2018).   
 Pay for performance for educators does not come without its challenges to public 
school districts throughout the country. According to Springer and Winters (2009), pay 
for performance had no impact on student achievement. This conclusion was based on a 
study conducted using a very large sample of elementary schools in New York City for 
both the experimental and control groups. Ritter and Jensen (2010) proposed specific 
foundational points can also pose as challenges in terms of educational performance pay 
designs and implementation to public school districts. These challenges include factors 
such as (a) attainability, (b) transparency, (c) substantiality and (d) sustainability.      
Summary 
 Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory was the theoretical lens through which the 
researcher investigated the construct of performance pay for teachers. Vroom’s theory is 




composed of three fundamental variables: expectancy, instrumentality, and valence. 
Though these variables are distinct, they work synergistically to influence individuals’ 
motivation and performance (Gemeda, 2015). Expectancy is the strength of the 
relationship between the level of effort teachers put forth to achieve student outcomes 
and the degree to which they believe their efforts will increase student achievement 
(Yuan et al., 2013). Instrumentality is a measure of individuals’ belief that their 
performance will produce their desired outcomes (Rice et al., 2015). Valence is the value 
teachers affix to a desired goal (Najera, 2017).  
After the passage of NCLB and the Race to the Top Initiative, the USDOE 
encouraged states to implement comprehensive teacher evaluation models for teachers 
wherein teachers’ effect on students’ academic achievement was a significant factor in 
determining teacher effectiveness (Lavania et al., 2015). The VAM is a mechanism for 
determining teachers’ effect on students’ test scores and their overall academic 
achievement (McCullough et al., 2015). The Florida Department of Education provides 
the 3-year aggregated results from the Florida VAM in both ELA and mathematics. 
Researchers identified challenges related to the implementation of VAM including the 
inability to account for differences in student demographic variables, the lack of support 
from teachers’ unions, the inability to get a precise measure of a teachers’ contributions 
to students’ learning (Amrein-Beardsley et al., 2016; Rouse et al., 2013). Researchers 
recommended that school districts consider the constructs of attainability, transparency, 
substantiality, and sustainability prior to implementing a VAM (Alger, 2014; Marsh, 
2014; Yuan et al., 2013). A review of the related literature revealed that models 




& Hodge, 2016). Current models assessing teacher quality use student outcomes on 
standardized testing as an integral component in determining teacher effectiveness (Yuan 
et al., 2013). 
Hoping to motivate teachers to improve their instructional practices and promote 
student achievement, many states implemented teacher performance-pay initiatives 
(Fulbeck, 2014; Maranto, 2014; Munroe, 2017; Robles, 2015). Researchers found that 
many of these initiatives failed because of inadequate funding and ambiguous criteria for 
assessing teacher effectiveness (Fulbeck, 2014; Robles, 2015). Munroe (2017) found 
teachers preferred a merit-based pay system that used alternative measures to determine 
student growth than a merit-based pay system that used students’ scores on standardized 
tests to determine student growth. School districts across the state of Florida base at least 
50% of teachers’ performance evaluation on students’ growth as determined by the FSA 
(Florida Department of Education, 2014). Since signing the SSA into law and 
implementing a teacher performance-pay initiative, the state of Florida has not 
investigated teachers’ perceptions of the initiative. Carruthers et al. (2018) noted that 
there has been no consistent improvement in student achievement since the Florida 
Legislature signed the SSA into law.  
Research Questions 
 The researcher used a descriptive survey research design and a convenience sample 
of  teachers who worked at a Title 1 elementary school in the southeastern United States 





1. What are urban elementary teachers’ perceptions of pay-for-performance 
initiatives?  
2. How do urban elementary teachers’ perceptions of pay-for-performance 
initiatives vary according to grade level?  
3. How do urban elementary teachers’ perceptions of pay-for-performance 
initiatives vary according to tenure and non-tenure status?  
4. How do urban elementary teachers’ perceptions of pay-for-performance 





















Chapter 3: Methodology 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to investigate Title 1 elementary 
teachers’ perceptions of a teacher performance pay initiative. Despite implementing 
teacher performance pay initiative during the 2015, the target school district had not 
investigated teachers’ perceptions of the initiative (Francilus, 2015). Chapter 3 includes a 
description of the participants and the target setting, the instrument, the research design, 
and the related procedures for conducting the study and analyzing the data. The final 
section of chapter 3 includes a description of the limitations of this study.  
Participants 
 The participants for this study were elementary school teachers who worked at a 
Title 1 elementary school that is part of a large urban school district. The target school 
employs approximately 60 professional staff, which includes classroom teachers, special 
education teachers, specialty area teachers, a school psychologist, and a guidance 
counselor. The setting for this applied dissertation study was an elementary school within 
an urban public-school district in Florida.  
The following were the target elementary school’s enrollment figures by 
race/ethnicity for the past five school years: (a) 2011-12 school year =  Hispanic = 528 
(57.6%), African American = 224 (24.5%), White = 122 (13.4%), and Other = 42 (4.5%);  
(b) 2012-13 school year = Hispanic = 550 (60.4%), African American = 208 (22.8%), 
White = 111 (12.2%), and Other = 33 (4.6%); (c) 2013-2014 school year = Hispanic 597 




(d) 2014-2015 school year = Hispanic = 553 (62.2%), African American = 181 (20.4%), 
White = 117 (13.2%), and Other = 26 (4.2%); and (e) 2015-2016 school year = Hispanic 
=622 (68,7%), African American = 137 (15.1%), White = 109  (12%), and  Other = 38 
(4.2%). From 2011 to 2016, the Hispanic population had the largest population increase 
(approximately 14%) while the African American population had the largest population 
decrease (approximately 10%). The construction of new schools within the target school 
district, which began prior to the start of the 2011-12 school year, prompted school 
leaders to change attendance boundaries to enhance racial diversity.  
 Sample. The researcher used a convenience sampling procedure to select this 
study’s participants. The sample for this study included 54 teachers who worked at a Title 
1 elementary school in the southeastern United States. Convenience sampling is a non-
probability sampling technique that is appropriate when researchers include participants 
who are easily accessible (Creswell, 2013; Suen, Huang, & Lee, 2014). One of the 
distinguishing characteristics of a non-probability sampling technique is that not all 
members of the target population have an equal chance of being part of a study. The 
inability to ensure that all members of the target population have an equal chance of 
being part of a study is referred to as sampling bias (Gurnsey, 2017). Sampling bias 
impacts researchers’ ability to generalize findings to the broader population (Creswell, 
2013; Suen et al., 2014). 
Instruments  
 The researcher used a 15-question Likert scale survey to investigate elementary 
teachers’ perceptions of a teacher performance pay initiative. Pemberton-Albright (2011) 




Albright assessed teachers’ and educational stakeholders’ perceptions of merit-based pay. 
Pemberton-Albright’s original survey includes the following types of question: (a) seven 
short-answer items pertaining to participant demographics, (b) 11 five-point Likert scale 
items, and (c) seven items requiring participants to either circle their responses or provide 
a short-answer response. Pemberton Albright conducted field testing to establish the 
reliability of the instrument. The field test included 20 elementary and middle school 
teachers from one Midwest state. The 20 teachers provided feedback regarding the 
wording of the questions and recommendations for enhancing the clarity of both the 
Likert-scale items and the short-answer responses. Pemberton Albright’s dissertation 
committee also provided feedback regarding the wording of both the Likert-scale items 
and the short-answer responses. Forand (2012) used a modified version of Pemberton-
Albright’s survey and determined the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the survey’s Likert 
scale items. Forand calculated a Cronbach’s coefficient of .60 for the Likert-scale items.  
 Although Pemberton-Albright’s original survey included 25-questions, the 
researcher modified the original survey and included only 15 Likert-scale responses. The 
researcher also included four demographic items at the very beginning of the survey. The 
four demographic items addressed the following: (a) gender, (b) grade-level or specialty 
area, (c) overall number of years in teaching, and (d) tenure/non-tenure status. The 
researcher collected these demographic data to compare participants’ perceptions across 
grade levels, years of experience, and tenure/non-tenure status.  
Procedures  
Design. The researcher used a descriptive survey research design. According to 




a group of participants and aim to determine and to describe the participants’ perceptions, 
attitudes, or beliefs regarding a phenomenon. One of the distinguishing characteristics of 
the descriptive survey research design is the use of a pre-existing group to measure or to 
compare the perceptions and beliefs of its group members. The pre-existing group the 
researcher included in this study was teachers who worked at a Title 1 elementary school.  
Researchers using the descriptive survey design do not make causal inferences nor do they 
determine the strength of the relationships between variables; instead, they analyze 
measures of central tendency (Ali & Bhaskar, 2016). The descriptive survey research 
design is prevalent within various social science fields and education, and those conducting 
descriptive survey research often seek to expand the body of knowledge regarding a topic 
(Creswell, 2013; Warne, 2017).  In regard to this study, the phenomenon under 
investigation was urban teachers’ perceptions of teacher performance pay. The researcher 
used a survey instrument to determine teachers’ perceptions and to compare participants’ 
perceptions across several demographic categories.   
Data collection. After completing all of Nova Southeastern University’s IRB 
requirements and receiving permission from the university to conduct this study, the 
researcher completed all the target school district’s related requirements for conducting 
research in its schools. The researcher submitted all related Nova IRB and school district 
documents to the target school district’s research center. Upon receiving permission from 
the target school district’s research center, the researcher met with the target school’s 
principal and provided him with an overview of the study, the time commitment 
associated with participating in this study, and the related procedures for ensuring 





After receiving permission to conduct the study from the target school’s principal, 
the researcher asked the target school’s secretary to provide the school email addresses of 
the target school’s teachers. The researcher asked the secretary to include each teacher’s 
email address in an Excel spreadsheet. The spreadsheet included only the teacher’s email 
address. The researcher distributed the survey through Survey Monkey and participants 
completed the survey online. Three days prior to receiving the actual survey, Survey 
Monkey sent out a pre-notification email describing the survey instrument and stating the 
amount of time it would take to complete the survey.     
Survey Monkey sent out a second email to let participants know that they could 
complete the actual survey. The email included a link to the survey. Upon clicking on the 
link, participants first reviewed an informed consent document wherein the researcher 
stated that participation in this study was voluntary and that no identifying information 
would be recorded. By completing the survey, participants established their informed 
consent to participate. The survey was available for two weeks. Participants who did not 
complete the survey within the first the first week received a second email at the 
beginning of week two. The content in the second email was identical to the content in 
the first email. The researcher excluded the data from any participants who did not 
complete the four demographic items and 15 Likert-scale items. The researcher kept all 
survey responses in a secure filing cabinet, to which only the researcher had a key. Upon 
completing this study, the researcher will keep all data for a 3-year period.   
Data analysis. The researcher used independent t tests to compare teacher’ 




paired t test and an independent t test. Researchers use a paired t test when one group of 
participants receives the same intervention, and they want to compare the group’s mean 
score before and after it receives the intervention (Creswell, 2013; Kim, 2015).   
According to Kim (2015), an independent t test is appropriate when researchers seek to 
compare the means of two independent groups who receive the same condition. For this 
study, the researcher used an independent t test. This was an appropriate test because the 
researcher had two independent groups and compared the two groups’ mean scores. 
Prior to conducting an independent t test, the researcher had to adjust the 
significance level and to calculate the Cohen’s d statistic. The significance level is the 
probability of obtaining a result by chance alone, and it is reported as a p-value 
(Armstrong, 2014; Hall & Richardson, 2016). The Cohen’s d is a measure of effect size, 
and researchers calculate this measure by determining the mean difference between two 
groups (Borenstein, Rothstein, & Cohen, 2001). The researcher used the Bonferroni 
correction to adjust the significance level. In Chapter 4 of the document, the researcher 
provided a thorough rationale for adjusting the significance level and for calculating the 
Cohen’s d statistic to answer research questions 2 through 4.  
The researcher had four research questions. For the first research question, the 
researcher reported the central measures of tendency (i.e., mean, median, and mode). For 
the second research question, the researcher used an independent t test to compare the 
mean scores of Pre-K, Kindergarten, and Grade 1 teachers and those of Grade 2, Grade 3, 
Grade 4, and Grade 5 teachers. For the third research question, the researcher compared 
the mean scores of teachers with tenure status and the mean scores of teachers with non-




of teachers who had more than 10 years of teaching experience and the mean scores of 
teachers with fewer than 10 years of teaching experience. Finally, the researcher 
conducted a primary analysis and a secondary analysis for both Research Question 2 and 























Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to investigate teachers’ perceptions of 
a teacher performance-pay initiative that was initiated in 2015 at the target school 
(Francilus, 2015). Research investigating the perceptions of teachers’ in school districts 
across the United States regarding performance pay initiatives is scant (Marsh, 2014; 
Stephens, 2015; Viscardi, 2014). The target school district had not investigated teachers’ 
perceptions of its teacher performance-pay initiative.  
The researcher compared teachers’ perceptions of a teacher performance-pay 
initiative across multiple demographic factors could enable educational stakeholders at 
both the district- and school-level to develop a clear understanding of the extent to which 
one elementary school’s teachers perceived that performance pay impacted their job 
performance across the factors of grade level, years of experience, and tenure and non-
tenure status. The Title 1 elementary school is part of a large urban school district in the 
southeastern part of the United States. The sample was composed of elementary school 
teachers who worked at a Title 1 elementary school during the 2018-19 school year. The 
sample for this study included 54 teachers who worked at a Title 1 elementary school in 
the southeastern United States; however, the researcher included 52 teachers in the data 
analysis. Upon reviewing participants’ responses to the survey items, the researcher 
found 50 participants completed the entire survey and four participants did not complete 
the entire survey. Two teachers did not complete survey items 8-12 and two teachers did 
not complete the demographic items and background questions. For the data analysis, the 





Of the 52 respondents included in the analysis, 49 (94.2%) were females and three 
(5.8%) were males. The mean age of respondents was 48.69 (SD = 11.88), and the mean 
number of years of teaching experience among them was 19.31 (SD = 10.77). More than 
half the teachers (29 teachers; 55.8%) had tenure, while the remaining subjects (23 
teachers; 44.2%) did not have tenure.   
There were five teachers (9.6%) who were in the DROP program and there were 
47 (90.4%) of the participants who were not in the DROP program.  The researcher 
included from seven different grade levels ranging from pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, 
and first through fifth grade. Table 1 shows the number of teachers teaching at each grade 
level.  
Table 1 
Frequencies of Teachers at Each Grade Level 
Grade Level n % 
Pre-K 1 1.9 
Kindergarten 11 21.2 
Grade 1 11 21.2 
Grade 2 15 28.8 
Grade 3 20 38.5 
Grade 4 18 34.6 
Grade 5 17 32.7 
Note. The numbers add up to more than 52, and to more than  




Within this section, the researcher presents the results for each of the research 




researcher had methodological considerations to consider. The methodological 
considerations were statistical adjustments and effect size calculations. The researcher 
provides a thorough description of and empirical evidence to support the appropriateness 
for each methodological consideration.    
Methodological considerations. The first consideration was the need to adjust 
the significance level for Research Question 2, Research Question 3, and Research 
Question 4 because the researcher included multiple research questions and conducted 
multiple analyses (Pérez, & Pericchi, 2014). By conducting this adjustment, researchers 
change the critical value below which they consider their findings significant (Chen, 
Feng, & Yi, 2017). The researcher used the Bonferroni correction to achieve this 
adjustment. The second consideration was the researcher’s use of Cohen’s d as the 
measure of effect size. The researcher has discussed each of these two considerations and 
provided evidence to support their appropriateness in the subsequent sections of this 
applied dissertation.  
Bonferroni correction. Researchers increase the likelihood of having at least one 
randomly significant result when they conduct multiple analyses involving several 
statistical tests and thereby increase their chances of not making an incorrect conclusion 
(Armstrong, 2014; Hall & Richardson, 2016). To decrease the likelihood of making an 
incorrect conclusion regarding significance between groups, researchers conduct a 
Bonferroni correction to determine an adjusted p value (Armstrong, 2014). A Bonferroni 
correction is an appropriate adjustment method for offsetting any issues researchers 
encounter when conducting multiple analyses and for decreasing the likelihood of them 




(Armstrong, 2014). The Bonferroni correction calls for dividing the total significance 
level, which is .05 in most studies, by the number of analyses. The researcher had four 
research questions.   
The researcher did not conduct significance testing for Research Question 1 but 
did conduct significance testing and primary analysis for each of the other three research 
questions. For the Bonferroni correction, the researcher divided the p value of .05 by 3, 
which yielded a p value of .0167. Thus, .0167 was the significance required of each 
analysis to have an overall significance level of .05 for the study. Additional analyses 
performed were considered secondary and therefore not included in the Bonferroni 
correction. 
Cohen's d. Effect size is reported in order to indicate the importance of a study’s 
results (American Psychological Association, 2010). Although effect sizes tend to be 
larger when p is significant, they measure something different. Effect size measures the 
standardized difference between the two means in a t test, or, in other words, the number 
of standard deviation units of the effect. Cohen’s d is the effect size measure the 
American Psychological Association recommends for reporting the results of t tests 
(Nicol & Pexman, 2010). Cohen's d is one measure of effect size: the standardized 
difference between two means in a t test. Cohen’s conventions for the social sciences are 
that d = 0.2 is considered a small effect size, d = 0.5 is a medium effect size, and d = 0.8 
is a large effect size (Borenstein et al., 2001). Educational survey data are subjective as 
participants are expressing their opinions. Therefore, these conventions are appropriate 




The Teachers’ Perceptions of Performance Pay (TPPP) Scale  
The researcher used the results from the TPPP scale and a mean of the responses 
to the following five survey items to address all four research questions (see Appendix): 
• A salary schedule without merit pay is an adequate way to pay teachers  
• Merit pay is an appropriate way to increase teacher wages  
• Merit pay is an appropriate way to reward teacher performance  
• I approve of the teacher merit pay system used by M-DCPS in the past  
• I approve of the merit pay system used by the state of Florida  
All five items had three response options: Yes (coded as 1), Somewhat (coded as 
2), and No (coded as 3). In order to make support for merit pay the higher scores, as is 
conventional, the researcher reversed the codes for the responses on the last four 
questions. Thus, participants’ responses on the scale ranged from 1 (against merit pay on 
all five questions) to 3 (in favor of merit pay on all five questions). 
Research Questions 
Research Question 1. Research Question 1 was as follows: What are urban 
elementary teachers’ perceptions of pay-for-performance initiatives? 
TPPP analysis. In order to approximate the meaning of the responses to the 
original items using the TPPP scale scores, the researcher created a grouped variable, 
TPPPG. Note that the groups in TPPPG are named differently than the scale points in the 
original items. This is because TPPPG measures averages over all the items, whereas the 
scale points were used for individual items.   
TPPPG had three groups: (a) 1−1.6 (similar to the scale point No in the original 




2.4−3 (similar to the scale point Yes in the original items). As can be seen in Table 2, 
nearly half (46.2%) of the respondents were mostly opposed to performance pay, 
approximately one-third (34.6%) had mixed feelings, and only about one in five (19.2%) 
were mostly supportive of performance pay. 
Table 2 
Teachers' Perceptions of Performance Pay, Grouped 
Items 8-12 n % 
Mostly no 24 46.2 
Mixed feelings  18 34.6 
Mostly yes 10 19.2 
 
The lack of support of performance pay was also reflected in the summary 
statistics for the (ungrouped) TPPP scale: The mean was 1.63 (SD = 0.56), the median 
was 1.6, and the mode was 1. The researcher found 11 of the respondents (21.2%) 
answered No to all five of the items in the scale. 
Additional descriptive analysis. In addition to investigating whether teachers 
were in favor of using performance pay or not, the researcher wanted to investigate 
teachers’ perceptions of various aspects of the performance pay initiative while the 
initiative was fully in place across the target school district and participants had a clear 
understanding of the standards used by school district leaders to determine performance 
pay for their teachers. Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 include the summary statistics for 
Items 13, 14, and 15, respectively, and the researcher placed the mean rating for each 




variable TPPP, lower ratings indicate support of performance pay and higher ratings 
indicate lack of support of performance pay.   
The researcher found that teachers did not support the use of any of the methods 
of merit pay listed on the survey. Further analysis of the results revealed the lowest mean 
score (which was the highest level of support) was 4.50, which was halfway between 
partly and slightly supportive, and the highest mean score (lowest level of support) was 
6.04, which was minimally supportive and only 0.96 from not being supportive at all.  
The most popular (although still not supported) methods were students' individual 
growth and teachers’ years of service while the least popular were the use of parent 
evaluations and students' district test scores. Table 3 lists the mean score for each method 






Descriptive Statistics for Item 13, Sorted by Mean Score 
Item 13  M SD Mdn 
Students’ individual growth  4.50 1.91 4 
Years of service 4.66 1.92 4 
Students' year-to-year growth  4.94 1.75 4.5 
Students' targeted growth  5.08 1.81 5 
Students' classroom test scores 5.30 1.82 6 
Administrator observation 5.38 1.50 6 
Students' state test scores  5.62 1.44 6 
Student portfolios 5.70 1.42 6 
Other teachers' performance  5.82 1.71 7 
Students report card grades from Common Core 5.82 1.55 7 
Students' district test scores 5.86 1.43 7 
Parent evaluations 6.04 1.43 7 
Note. Scale points for the item: 1 exclusively, 2 almost exclusively, 3 mainly, 4 partly, 5 slightly, 6 
minimally, 7 not at all. 
 
Next, the researcher found that teachers were more likely to want themselves and 
teacher professional associations involved in not only developing a merit pay plan but 
also monitoring and evaluating a merit pay plan; conversely, they were less likely to want 
the Florida State DOE involved in developing a merit pay plan and least likely to want 
parents involved in developing a merit pay plan. Table 4 provides the descriptive 





Descriptive Statistics for Item 14, Sorted by Mean Score 
Item 14  M SD Mdn 
Individual teachers  3.46 1.97 3 
Teacher professional associations 3.92 1.97 4 
Florida State DOE 5.24 1.70 5.5 
Parents 6.30 1.22 7 
Note. Scale points for the item: 1 exclusively, 2 almost exclusively, 3 mainly, 4 partly, 5 slightly, 6 
minimally, 7 not at all. 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Item 15, Sorted by Mean Score 
Item 15  M SD Mdn 
Individual teachers 3.80 2.07 4 
Teacher professional associations 4.10 1.94 4 
Florida State DOE 5.06 1.77 4.5 
Parents 6.38 1.12 7 
Note. Scale points for the item: 1 exclusively, 2 almost exclusively, 3 mainly, 4 partly, 5 slightly, 6 
minimally, 7 not at all. 
 
 Research Question 2. Research Question 2 was as follows: How do urban 
elementary teachers’ perceptions of pay-for-performance initiatives vary according to 
grade level? 
The researcher included teachers from seven different grade levels (Pre-K, 
kindergarten, and Grades 1-5); however, in order to perform the planned analysis, which 
was an independent t test, the researcher had to configure the groups because some 
teachers taught more than one grade level and because an independent t test does not 
allow a respondent to appear in both groups. To address issues pertaining to grouping, the 




provided the cleanest break among teachers. To address these issues, a correlational 
analysis was performed. The researcher found a significant correlation between teaching 
kindergarten and teaching Grade 1 and significant correlations among teaching Grade 2 
to Grade 5. Nonetheless, there was only one teacher respondent who taught pre-
kindergarten. Table 6 includes the results of the correlational analysis across grade levels, 
with the shading in the table showing the two groupings.   
Table 6 
Correlations Among Levels Taught 
Grade Levels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Pre-K (n =1) 1       
2. Kindergarten (n =11) -.07 1      
3. Grade 1 (n = 11) -.07  .31* 1     
4. Grade 2 (n = 15) -.09 .09 -.02 1    
5. Grade 3 (n = 20) -.11   -.02 -.12 .28* 1   
6. Grade 4 (n = 18) -.10 .12  .02 .34* .34* 1  
7. Grade 5 (n = 17) -.10 .04 -.06 .46* .29* .36* 1 
*
 Correlation is significant at p < .05 (2-tailed) or lower. 
Based on the results of the correlational analysis, the researcher placed teachers 
who taught Pre-K, kindergarten, or Grade 1 in Group 1 and those who taught Grade 2, 
Grade 3, Grade 4, or Grade 5 in Group 2. Five teachers who taught students across all 
grade levels could have been classified in both groups (these were teachers who taught a 
special subject in all or most of the grade levels); however, and because the categories for 
a t test must not overlap, the researcher had to assign those five teachers to one of the two 
groups. The researcher considered both options and assigned all five teachers to each 




answer the research question and to decrease the likelihood of making an incorrect 
conclusion by conducting multiple (as noted by discussion of the Bonferroni correction 
above) analyses, the researcher used the primary analysis to test for significance; 
however, the researcher did not test for significance in the secondary analysis.  
For the primary analysis (used to test Research Question 2), the first group 
included the teachers who taught pre-K, kindergarten, or Grade 1 (n = 18; 34.6%), and 
the second group included all the other teachers (n = 34; 65.4%). By configuring the 
groups in that manner, the researcher reduced the discrepancy between the number of 
teachers in each group. In the secondary analysis, the first group included the teachers 
who taught in Grade 2, Grade 3, Grade 4, or Grade 5 (n = 13, 25.0%), and the second 
group included all the other teachers (n = 39, 75.0%). 
The researcher concluded that teachers of Pre-K, kindergarten, and Grade 1 were 
slightly more supportive of performance pay (mean TPPP = 1.74) than teachers who 
taught only Grades 2−5 (mean TPPP = 1.57); however, the difference was not significant 
(t[50] = 1.07, p = .291), and the effect size was small, with Cohen’s d = 0.30. Table 7 
includes the results for each group.  
Table 7 
TPPP Results: Pre-K-Grade 1 and Grade 2-Grade 5  
 
Grade Level Taught n M SD t(50) p Cohen's d 
Pre-K, Kindergarten, or Grade 1 18 1.74 0.56 1.07 .291 0.30 
Grades 2−5 34 1.57 0.56    
Note. Levene's test for equality of variances was not significant (F = 0.04, p = .834), so equal variances 
were assumed. 
 
For the secondary analysis, the researcher found teachers of Pre-K, kindergarten, and 




teachers of Grades 2−5 (mean TPPP = 1.62); however, the difference was even smaller 
(0.06) than the difference for the primary comparison (0.17). As noted above, the 
secondary analysis did not include significance testing.   
Research Question 3. Research Question 3 was as follows: How do urban 
elementary teachers’ perceptions of pay-for-performance initiatives vary according to 
tenure and non-tenure status? 
The researcher divided teachers into two groups: those who were tenured (29 
teachers, 55.8%) and those who were not tenured and worked on an annual contract (23 
teachers, 44.2%). The researcher found tenured teachers were slightly less supportive of 
performance pay (mean TPPP = 1.59) than non-tenured teachers were (mean TPPP = 
1.69); however, the difference was small (-0.10) and not significant (t[50] = -0.641, p = 
.524). Further analysis of the findings revealed that Cohen's d was only 0.16, which was 
even smaller than a small effect. Table 8 includes the results for Research Question 3.  
Table 8 
TPPP Results: Tenured and Nontenured Teachers  
 
Tenure Status n M SD t(50) p Cohen's d 
Tenured teachers 29 1.59 0.56 -0.64 .524 0.16 
Nontenured (contract) teachers 23 1.69 0.57    
Note. Levene's test for equality of variances was not significant (F = 0.29, p = .594), so equal variances 
were assumed. 
 
 Research Question 4. Research Question 4 was as follows: How do urban 
elementary teachers’ perceptions of pay-for-performance initiatives vary according to 
their years of experience? 
 The proposed data analysis for Research Question 4 was to compare teachers with 




was the primary analysis; however, the researcher conducted additional analyses because 
the data suggested that these may be an appropriate methodology for analyzing data.  
Primary analysis. The researcher divided teachers into one of the following two 
groups: those with fewer than 10 years of experience (eight teachers, 15.4%) and those 
with 10 or more years of experience (44 teachers, 84.6%). The researcher found that 
teachers with fewer than 10 years of experience were more supportive of performance 
pay (mean TPPP = 2.05) than teachers with 10 or more years of experience (mean TPPP 
= 1.56).  
The researcher also concluded that the difference (0.49) was almost significant 
(t[50] = 2.41, p = .020). This is close to the critical significance level of .0167 when 
recalling that the Bonferroni correction was used. Cohen's d was 0.88, which is 
considered a large effect size. The data illustrated in Table 9 provides the results of this 
analysis.   
Table 9 
TPPP Differences: Primary Analysis 
 
Teaching experience n M SD t(50) p Cohen's d 
Fewer than 10 years 8 2.05 0.58 2.41 .020 0.88 
10 or more years  44 1.56 0.53    







Cutpoint of 20 years of teaching experience. A cross tabulation of TPPPG by 5-
year experience groups was the next analysis the researcher conducted. A cross tabulation 
is appropriate when determining the relationship between two or more variables (Umer & 
Razi, 2018). The researcher determined that teachers with 20 or fewer years of 
experience (n = 34; 65.4%; mean TPPP = 1.78) were much more likely to support 
performance pay than teachers with more than 20 years of experience (n = 18; 34.6%; 
mean TPPP = 1.37). In this case, the difference was larger (0.41) and had a p value that 
would be considered significant had it been the primary analysis, even if the researcher 
used the Bonferroni correction (t[49.62] = 3.07, p =.003). In addition, Cohen's d was 
0.84S, which is considered a large effect size. 
Table 10 
TPPP Differences: Secondary Analysis  
 
Teaching experience n M SD df t p Cohen's d 
20 or fewer years  29 1.78 0.60 49.62 3.07 .003 0.84 
20 or more years  23 1.37 0.35     
Note. Levene's test for equality of variances was significant (F = 11.32, p = .001), so equal variances were 
not assumed. 
 
 Correlational analysis. When considering the large (> .8) effect sizes and low p 
values (< .05) in the analyses for the cutpoints of 10 and 20 years, combined with the 
mean TPPP levels for each of the experience groups, the researcher believed there may 
be a negative linear correlation between years of teaching experience and perception of 
performance pay. In other words, as the number of years of teaching experience 
increased, teachers’ perceptions of performance pay decreased. The correlation for this 





Nearly half (46.2%) of the respondents were mostly opposed to performance pay, 
approximately one-third (34.6%) had mixed feelings, and only about one in five (19.2%) 
were mostly supportive of performance pay (The mean was 1.6 on a scale from 1 to 3.). 
The researcher found no significant difference in perceptions of performance pay among 
teachers who taught at different grade levels or between tenured and nontenured teachers. 
However, the researcher did find a relationship between years of teaching experience and 
teachers’ perceptions of performance pay, with the number of years of teaching 


















Chapter 5: Discussion 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this quantitative study was to investigate teachers’ perceptions of 
a teacher performance-pay initiative. The data collection tool was a modified version of 
Pemberton-Albright’s 2011 survey. Pemberton-Albright (2011) created the survey and 
used it in a study titled The Merit of Merit Pay. This researcher modified Pemberton-
Albright original 25-item survey and included 15 Likert-scale responses and four 
demographic items addressing the following areas: (a) gender; (b) grade-level or 
specialty area; (c) overall number of years in teaching; and, (d) tenure/non-tenure status.  
Summary of Findings 
 The researcher found that more than 80% of the respondents were either mostly 
opposed to or had mixed feelings about performance pay for teachers and less than 20% 
of respondents were mostly supportive of performance pay for teachers. Further analysis 
of the findings revealed that teachers who were mostly opposed to performance pay had 
the largest representation, with close to half (46.2%) of all respondents choosing this 
option. When comparing teachers’ perceptions of performance pay across grade levels, 
the researcher found that although Pre-K, kindergarten, and Grade 1 teachers were 
slightly more supportive than Grade 2, Grade 3, Grade 4, and Grade 5 teachers (TPPP 
difference of 0.17 between the two groups), the difference between the two groups was 
not significant and the effect size was small.  
 When comparing teachers’ perceptions of performance pay on the basis of tenure 
and non-tenure status, the researcher concluded that non-tenure teachers were slightly 




however, and similar to the result for research question 2, the difference was not 
significant.  
Interpretation of Findings 
Although there were no statistically significant differences in perceptions of 
performance pay among teachers who taught at different grade levels or between tenured 
and nontenured teachers, the researcher was able to gain a clear understanding of 
teachers’ perceptions of performance-pay initiatives. The researcher found that teachers 
who were mostly opposed to performance pay had the largest representation across the 
three categories and teacher who had mixed feelings had the second largest 
representation. Based on these findings, the researcher concludes that close to half of the 
teachers at the Title 1 elementary school had negative perceptions of performance-pay 
initiatives.  
The researcher also concludes that the majority of those opposed to performance-
pay initiatives have 20 or more years’ teaching experience. The researcher uses the 
results of the correlation analysis as the basis for this conclusion as there was a negative 
correlation between the years of teaching experience and teachers’ perceptions of 
performance-pay initiatives. Specifically, as the number of years of teaching increased, 
teachers’ perceptions of performance pay decreased.  
Although the teachers at the target school represented a small percentage of the 
overall percentage of teachers across the school district, the researcher believes the 
findings of this study have implications at the local and state level. Stakeholders from the 
target school district and across the target state who are directly involved in establishing, 




the appropriateness and the feasibility of performance-pay initiatives going forward and 
the environment they may foster within schools across both the target school district and 
the state. Researchers underscored the transformative impact of collaboration on 
teachers’ instructional effectiveness (Carter, 2015; Darling-Hammond, 2015; Fulbeck, 
2014). Collaboration is especially effective when teachers share instructional practices 
and resources (Russ, 2015). Teachers who engage in consistent and substantive 
collaboration demonstrated higher levels of instructional effectiveness than teachers who 
did not. Education policymakers who implement performance pay initiatives may 
promote unhealthy competition among teachers, decrease the extent of collegiality among 
teachers, and undermine the overarching goal of performance-pay initiatives, which is to 
compel teachers to increase student achievement through the use of financial incentives 
(Carter, 2015; Routh, 2014; Russ, 2015). Carter (2015) found that close to half of 
teachers from one school district in the Southeast United States believed a performance 
pay-initiative led to contention among teachers and resulted in teachers being reticent to 
share pedagogical strategies and resources.  
By implementing a performance-pay initiative, stakeholders from the target 
school district and across the target state may undermine the culture school leaders and 
teachers are seeking to establish to promote both teacher effectiveness and student 
achievement (Carter, 2015). The culture they are seeking to establish is one in which 
teachers work together in professional learning communities and review student data, 
analyze and refine their instructional practices, and align curriculum and lesson plans to 
state standards (Russ, 2015). Teachers and administrators who establish that type of a 




effectiveness and promote student learning (Routh, 2014). Establishing the conditions 
teachers need to maximize instructional effectiveness and promote student learning may 
not be feasible in the context of a performance-pay initiative.  
School board members should also consider that a performance-pay initiative will 
not be successful unless teachers completely support the initiative and the corresponding 
methods they will use to determine if teachers are eligible for performance-pay bonuses 
(Viscardi, 2014). Of the 12 methods for determining performance pay listed on the 
survey, some of which the school board uses to determine the awarding of performance 
pay, participants were partly to slightly supportive of only three methods, slightly to 
minimally supportive of eight methods, and minimally to not at all supportive of one 
method. With this in mind, school board members should seek input regarding the criteria 
for determining the awarding of performance pay. Stephens (2015) believed seeking 
input from teachers regarding the criteria for determining performance pay was an 
effective approach for garnering teachers’ support of a performance pay initiative.  
In future contract negotiations, school board members should work in conjunction 
with the bargaining team for the teachers’ union. The bargaining team for the teachers’ 
union can disseminate a survey to all teachers across the target school district and ask 
them to state which items they believe the school board should use to determine the 
awarding of performance pay. The bargaining team for the teachers’ union can then meet 
with the school board’s bargaining team and present the findings from the survey. The 
two teams can compose a collective bargaining agreement and establish the criteria for 
determining performance pay. Finally, the bargaining team for the teachers’ union can 




reject the terms of the agreement. Under this type of negotiation process, the school board 
is empowering teachers by giving them input, and ultimately, a degree of autonomy over 
the standards by which the school district would determine their performance.  
At the state level, stakeholders should consider the findings of this study and the 
negative environment they may create in schools across the state by endorsing 
performance-pay initiatives. Recently, the state’s educational policymakers revised a 
measure and passed reforms aimed at recruiting, retaining, and awarding successful 
teachers. These reforms, which are part of the target state’s Best and Brightest program, 
provide bonuses for teachers who receive a rating of either effective or highly based on 
their yearly evaluations and students’ tests scores. Prior to these recent reforms, the 
program awarded bonuses to only teachers who receive a rating highly effective rating. 
Under these reforms, more teachers will receive performance-pay bonuses. From a union 
perspective, however, these reforms may cause resentment among teachers who give 
their best each day; however, and because of circumstances beyond their control, they 
may not meet the qualifying criteria for the performance-pay bonuses. School-based 
professionals who are not classroom teachers, including school psychologists, school 
counselors, and media specialists, are at a distinct disadvantage as they either teach 
subjects or have roles within their buildings in which evaluating their effectiveness with 
respect to the performance is not possible because their students do not take standardized 
tests. Prior to implementing other performance-pay initiatives, educational policymakers 
should seek input from teachers who work in various parts of the target and seek their 
input regarding the criteria for determining performance pay for determining performance 




Context of Findings 
Prior researchers found that teachers had negative perceptions of performance pay 
(Edenfield, 2014; Routh, 2014; Russ, 2015). The researcher’s finding that more than 80% 
of the target school’s teacher were either mostly opposed to or had mixed beliefs about 
performance-pay initiatives on the basis of teacher performance aligned with that of 
Edenfield (2014), Russ (2015), and Routh (2014). Edenfield (2014) found that 
approximately 80% of one southeastern state’s teachers opposed merit pay based on 
teacher performance in the area of student achievement. Russ (2015) investigated the 
perceptions of 250 teachers from two school districts in the midwestern part of the United 
States regarding merit-pay initiatives and concluded that teachers had negative 
perceptions of merit-pay initiatives in which the criteria for determining monetary 
rewards were teacher evaluations, students’ standardized test scores, and both school- and 
district-level performance on standardized tests.   
Although much broader in scope by including a random sample of teachers from 
one midwestern state when compared to the scope of both this study and Russ’s 2015 
study, Routh (2014) also found teachers had negative perceptions of merit-pay initiatives 
based on teacher evaluation. Therefore, Routh’s finding aligned with that of both the 
researchers and Russ (2015). The researcher’s finding that teachers with fewer than 10 
years’ experience were more supportive of performance pay than teachers with more than 
10 years’ experience, although the difference was not quite significant, and teachers with 
fewer than 20 years’ experience were more supportive than teachers with more than 20 




of teachers from one large school district in the southeastern part of the United States did 
not differ based on years of teaching experience.  
Implications of the Findings 
 The researcher found that teachers had negative perceptions of teacher 
  
performance pay and were mostly opposed to it. These findings may have implications in 
 
developing alternative pay scales for teachers. The researcher also found a relationship 
 
between the number of years of experience and perceptions. For each of the experience 
  
groups, the researcher believed there may be a negative linear correlation between years 
 
of teaching experience and perception of performance pay. In other words, as the number 
 
of years of teaching experience increased, teachers’ perceptions of performance pay 
 
decreased. Because of the link between years of experience and negative perceptions of 
 
performance pay, an implication of the findings could allow administrators and  
 
professional organizations to take a closer look at alternative ways to pay teachers 
 
perhaps through a pay scale built in to the contract for teachers with less than 10 years 
 
and more than 10 years. 
 
 Limitations of the Study 
 
 Every study has limitations, and researchers should not hesitate to describe these 
limitations (Olufowote, 2017). The most common limitations of a study are sample size, 
sampling procedures, data collection instruments and procedures, research design, 
accessibility of participants (Olufowote, 2017; Theofanidis & Fountouki, 2019). By 
identifying their limitations, researchers convey a comprehensive understanding of their 
topic and the need to increase the body of knowledge within a discipline. The following 




Convenience sampling. The use of convenience sampling was the first limitation 
of this study. Convenience sampling is appropriate when researchers are unable to ensure 
that every participant in a population will have an equal chance of being included in their 
studies and when they must include the most accessible and convenient population 
(Asiamah, Mensah, & Oteng-Abayie, 2017; Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 2016). Reduced 
costs and simple and efficient execution are the most noteworthy advantages of 
convenience sampling (Etikan et al., 2016; Jager, Putnick, & Bornstein, 2017). Although 
researchers who use convenience sampling can glean insight regarding the characteristics 
of a segment of an accessible population, they cannot generalize their findings to the 
broader representative population, thereby impacting the external validity of their study 
(Etikan et al., 2016).  
By using convenience sampling, which is a non-probability sampling procedure, 
the researcher was unable to determine if the participants in this study were an accurate 
representation of the population. Because the participants in this study were not an 
accurate representation of the population, the researcher could not generalize this study’s 
findings to the broader population. Finally, the researcher was unable to control for 
discrepancies in the number of participants in each group. For example, when comparing 
TPPP differences based on experience, one group had eight participants and the other 
group had 44 participants.  
Data analysis procedures. The second limitation was the data analysis 
procedures. The researcher conducted multiple analyses and used several statistical tests 
to answer each research question. Researchers increase the likelihood of making an 




tests (Armstrong, 2014; Hall & Richardson, 2016). To decrease the likelihood of making 
an incorrect conclusion, researchers conduct a Bonferroni correction to determine an 
adjusted p value (Armstrong, 2014). Although the Bonferroni correction is an appropriate 
for decreasing the likelihood of making incorrect conclusions, it cannot guarantee that 
researchers’ conclusions are precise (Hall & Richardson, 2016). The researcher used a 
Bonferroni correction to offset any issues pertaining to multiple analyses and to increase 
the likelihood of making precise conclusions; however, the researcher cannot guarantee 
there were no significant differences in perceptions of performance pay among teachers 
who taught at different grade levels or between tenured and nontenured teachers nor can 
the researcher guarantee that a statistically significant relationship existed between years 
of teaching experience and teachers’ perceptions of performance pay.   
Data collection procedures. The third limitation was the researcher could not 
guarantee that participants provided truthful responses to the survey items. Participants in 
this study completed their survey on the Survey Monkey site. Survey Monkey is an 
online survey tool that researchers use to create, send, and analyze their surveys. Through 
Survey Monkey’s data collection menu, researchers can determine who responds to 
survey, send an initial email to participants reminding them to complete a survey, send 
out reminder emails to participants who have not completed their survey, and collect the 
results of surveys (Forris, 2015). One concern regarding the use of the Survey Monkey 
platform is the ability of researchers to ensure participant confidentiality if a data breach 
occurs (Regmi, Waithaka, Paudyal, Simkhada, & van Teijlingen, 2016). Researchers 
using this form of data collection procedure must make every effort to ensure participant 




confidentiality, researchers can use the first page of the survey to inform participants that 
any identifying information will be removed and participants that they have the right to 
opt out of the survey at any time and not be part of the study. Although this measure may 
alleviate participants’ concerns regarding confidentiality, researchers cannot guarantee 
that participants will answer all survey items truthfully.  
With respect to this study, the researcher addressed any concerns participants may 
have had regarding confidentiality by stating that participation in this study was voluntary 
and that no identifying information would be recorded. The researcher included those 
statements at the beginning of the survey. By completing the survey, participants 
established their informed consent to participate. Despite assuring participants of the 
steps taken to ensure confidentiality, the researcher could not guarantee that participants 
provided accurate responses to the survey items.   
Future Research Directions 
The researcher found that despite implementing teacher performance pay in 2015, 
the target school district school board had not investigated teachers’ perceptions of the 
teacher performance pay initiative across any of its schools (Francilus, 2015). The 
researcher sought to address this gap in knowledge by investigating teachers’ perceptions 
of performance pay at one elementary school; however, and as noted above, the target 
school district is composed of 392 schools (171 = elementary, K-8 = 53, 48 = middle, 54 
= high schools, 8 = combination of K-12 schools, 12 = alternative and exceptional 
student education centers, 45 migrant pre-k outreach centers and teacher advancement 
program).  




overall number of schools under the jurisdiction of the target school district, the 
researcher investigated the perceptions of teachers from approximately 0.25% of the 
target school district’s schools; therefore, the first recommendation for future research is 
to conduct a similar study at other schools across the school district. Researchers 
conducting this type of a study should include multiple elementary schools.  
Researchers should also expand this scope of this study by investigating the 
perceptions of teachers who work at K-8, middle, and high schools and alternative 
learning centers across the school district. The researcher notes that the target school 
district is composed of three geographic regions, and each region is under the jurisdiction 
of a region superintendent and a central office staff. Each region is subdivided into feeder 
patterns, and within each region, the school district has established feeder patterns based 
on geography. Students living within a feeder pattern attend an assigned elementary 
school, middle school, and high school. Each feeder pattern has varying number of 
elementary, middle, and high schools. Within each of the target school district’s regions, 
future research should investigate teachers’ perceptions of performance pay across all 
elementary, middle, and high schools within a feeder pattern and then conduct 
comparisons across school levels (elementary schools vs. middle schools vs. high schools 
(Routh, 2014).  
Replicate study in other settings. A review of the related literature also revealed 
that target school districts across the southeastern state had not investigated teachers’ 
perceptions of the teacher performance pay initiative. With this in mind, the researcher 
recommends replicating this study in other school districts across the southeastern state.  




researchers should conduct this study at the middle, elementary, and high school levels. 
To further expand the body of knowledge, future research should compare teachers’ 
perceptions of the teacher performance pay initiative based on setting (rural vs. suburban 
vs. urban); hence, researchers could compare the perceptions of teachers who work in 
rural settings and those who work in urban settings and the perceptions of teachers who 
work in suburban settings and those who work in urban settings (Marsh, 2014).  
Use random sampling technique. As noted in the section on limitations,  the 
researcher used convenience sampling procedures, thereby generalizing findings to other 
settings was not possible. Hence, the third recommendation is for future research to 
replicate this study across other schools within the target school district and in school 
districts across the state and use random sampling procedures. Researchers who use a 
random sampling technique decrease the chance of selection bias and increase the chance 
of selecting a representative sample from the target population (Sharma, 2017).  
Implement a qualitative study model. Another recommendation is for future 
research to use a qualitative research approach to investigate teachers’ perceptions of 
performance pay. A qualitative approach is appropriate when researchers seek to provide 
an in-depth description of a phenomenon from the perspective of those with first-hand 
knowledge of the phenomenon (Hammarberg, Kirkman, & de Lacey, 2016). This in-
depth description is not possible with a quantitative approach (Creswell, 2013). 
Researchers who conduct a qualitative study could use a case study design and collect 
multiple forms of data. The forms of data they could use include interviews, observations, 
and artifacts. Although researchers who use a qualitative approach and a case study 




descriptions of teachers’ perceptions regarding performance pay initiatives and gain a 
clear understanding of the factors informing teachers’ perceptions and what if 

























Alger, V. E. (2014). Teacher incentive pay that works: A global survey of programs that 
improve student achievement. British Columbia, Canada: Barbara Mitchell Centre 
for Improvement in Education, Fraser Institute.  
Ali, Z., & Bhaskar, S. B. (2016). Basic statistical tools in research and data 
analysis. Indian Journal of Anesthesia, 60(9), 662–669. doi:10.4103/0019-
5049.19062 
American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American 
Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association. 
Amrein-Beardsley, A., Pivovarova, M., & Geiger, T. J. (2016). Value-added models: 
What the experts say. Phi Delta Kappan, 98(2), 35-40. 
doi:10.1177/0031721716671904 
Anderson, A. D., Hunt, A. N., Powell, R. E., & Dollar, C. B. (2013). Student perceptions 
of teaching transparency. The Journal of Effective Teaching, 13(2), 38-47.  
Armstrong, R. A. (2014). When to use the Bonferroni correction. Ophthalmic and 
Physiological Optics, 34(5), 502-508. doi:10.1111/opo.12131 
Asiamah, N., Mensah, H. K., & Oteng-Abayie, E. (2017). General, target, and accessible 
population: Demystifying the concepts for effective sampling. The Qualitative 
Report, 22(6), 1607-1621. 
Assessment, Research, and Data Analysis Division. (2014). Explaining the value-added 
model. Retrieved from http://www.oada.dadeschools.net  




performance: Some problems in the design and implementation of evaluation 
systems. Educational Researcher, 44(2), 77-86. doi:10.3102/0013189x15574904 
Bauries, S. R., Sutherland, B. J., & Legare, C. B. (2014) Brief of education law and 
educational measurement professors as amici curiae in support of plaintiffs-
appellants, Cook v. Steward (Policy Brief). Retrieved from 
http://uknowledgeuky.edu/law_facpub_advocacy/3                                           
Blazer, C. (2011). Status of teacher performance pay programs across the United States.   
(Information Capsule).  
Borenstein, M., Rothstein, H., & Cohen, J. (2001). Power and precision. Englewood, NJ: 
Biostat, Inc. 
Britton, J., & Propper, C. (2016). Teacher pay and school productivity: Exploiting wage   
           regulation. Journal of Public Economics, 133, 75-89. 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.004  
Buck, S., & Greene, J. P. (2011). Blocked, diluted, and co-opted. Education Next, 11(2), 
26-31. 
Buddhi, R. (2007). Merit pay for Florida teachers:  Design and implementation issues. 
RAND Education. 
Carlon, L. G. (2015). Merit pay for educators: An investigation of components 
significantly impacting student achievement (Doctoral dissertation). Available 
from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3680827) 
Carruthers, C., Figlio, D., & Sass, T. (2018). Did tenure reform in Florida affect student 






Chen, S. Y., Feng, Z., & Yi, X. (2017). A general introduction to adjustment for multiple 
comparisons. Journal of Thoracic Disease, 9(6), 1725–1729. 
doi:10.21037/jtd.2017.05.34 
Cocke, J. W. (2014). Florida teachers' knowledge and perceptions about student learning 
growth, assessment, and the Florida value-added model (Doctoral dissertation). 
Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3637958) 
Collins, C., & Amrein-Beardsley, A. (2014). Putting growth and value-added models on 
the map: A national overview. Teachers College Record, 116(1), 1-18.  
Creswell, J. W. (2013). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five 
approaches (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Darling-Hammond, L. (2015). Can value added add value to teacher evaluation. 
Educational Researcher, 44(2), 132-137. doi:10.3102/0013189X15575346 
Davis, J. B. (2014). The relationship between the growth score and the overall TEAM 
observation rating for teachers in Tennessee (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). 
East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, TN. 
Dean, J. D. (2015). Comparing schools: From value added to sound policy (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation). University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR.  
Deckers, L. (2014). Motivation: Biological, psychological, and environmental (4th ed.). 
Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.  
Doran, H. C. (2014) Methods for incorporating measurement error in value-added models 





Edenfield, J. (2014). Teachers' perceptions of merit pay in Georgia (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation). Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, GA. 
Etikan, I., Musa, S. A., & Alkassim, R. S. (2016). Comparison of convenience sampling 
and purposive sampling. American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics, 
5(1), 1-4. doi:10.11648/j.ajtas.20160501.11  
Farley, A. N. (2017). Review of for good measure? Teacher evaluation policy in the 
ESSA era. Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, School of Education.  
Finnigan, K. S., & Gross, B. (2007). Do accountability policy sanctions influence teacher 
motivation? lessons from Chicago's low-performing schools. American 
Educational Research Journal, 44(3), 594;629;-629. 
doi:10.3102/0002831207306767 
Florida Department of Education. (2008). Florida School Recognition Program: 2008 
general information. Retrieved from http://www.fldoe.org/evaluation/geninfo.asp 
Florida Department of Education. (2012). No Child Left Behind. Retrieved from 
http://www.fldoe.org/nclb/ 
Florida Department of Education. (2013). Governor Scott signs Student Success Act 
[Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.flgov.com/2011/03/24/governor-scott-
signs-studentsuccess-act/ 
Florida Department of Education. (2014). Florida School Recognition Program. 
Retrieved from http://www.fldoe.org/how-do-i/evaluation-reporting.stml  
Florida Department of Education. (2016).  2015-16 guide to calculating school and 






Florida Educational Accountability Act. (1971). Fla. Stat. ch. 76-223. 
Forand, S. (2012). Teachers’ attitudes and perceptions about pay-for-performance 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Northeastern University, Boston, MA.  
Forris, S. E. (2015). The quest for work and family balance using flexible work 
arrangements (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Walden University, 
Minneapolis, MN.  
Francilus, J. (2015, September). Miami-Dade teachers ratify new performance-pay 
system. Politico. Retrieved from 
https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2015/09/miami-dade-teachers-ratify-
new-performance-pay-system-025380 
Fulbeck, E. S. (2014). Teacher mobility and financial incentives: A descriptive analysis 
of Denver's ProComp. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 36(1), 67-82. 
doi:10.3102/0162373713503185  
Gamson, D., & Hodge, E. (2016). Education research and the shifting landscape of the 
American school district, 1816 to 2016. Review of Research in Education, 40(1), 
216-249. doi:10.3102/0091732X16670323 
Gemeda, F. T. (2015). Exploring teachers’ motivation for teaching and professional 
development in Ethiopia: Voices from the field. Journal of Studies in Education, 
5(2), 169-186. doi:10.5296/jse.v512.7459     
Gius, M. (2013). Using a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of 
teacher merit pay on student performance. Eastern Economic Journal, 39(1), 




Guerere, C. (2013). Value-added and observational measures used in the teacher 
evaluation process: A validation study (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). 
University of South Florida, Tampa, FL. 
Gurnsey, R. (2017). Statistics for research in psychology: A modern approach using 
estimation. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.  
Haertel, E. (2013). Reliability and validity of inferences about teachers based on student 
test scores. Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service.  
Hall, M., & Richardson, T. (2016). Basic statistics for comparing categorical data from 2 
or more groups. Hospital Pediatrics, 6(6), 383-385. doi:10.1542/hpeds.2015-0273 
Hammarberg, K., Kirkman, M., & de Lacey, S. (2016). Qualitative research methods: 
When to use them and how to judge them. Human Reproduction, 31(3), 498–501. 
doi:10.1093/humrep/dev334 
Han, J., & Yin, H. (2016). Teacher motivation:  Definition, research development and 
implications for teachers. Cogent Education, 3(1), 1-50. 
doi:10.1080/2331186X.2016.1217819 
Harrison, C., & Cohen-Vogel, L. (2012). The politics of teacher reform in Florida: 
Analyzing causal narratives surrounding state adoption of performance-based 
evaluations, performance pay, and tenure elimination. Peabody Journal of 
Education, 87(5), 517-534. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511490934 
Jager, J., Putnick, D. L., & Bornstein, M. H. (2017). II. More than just convenient: The 
scientific merits of homogeneous convenience samples. Monographs of the 





Jensen, N. C. (2011). The value of value-added measures. Office for Education Policy, 
8(2), 1-3. 
Jones, K. (2014). Teachers’ perspectives on the third grade retention policy at the 
primary grade level (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3632216)  
Jones, M. D. (2013). Teacher behavior under performance pay incentives. Economics of 
Education Review, 37, 148-164. doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2013.09.005 
Kane, T., & Staiger, D. (2012). Gathering feedback for teaching: Combining high-quality 
observations with student surveys and achievement gains. Seattle, WA: Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Kim, T. K. (2015). T test as a parametric statistic. Korean Journal of 
Anesthesiology, 68(6), 540–546. http://doi.org/10.4097/kjae.2015.68.6.540 
Laliberte, M. D. (2015). Florida’s A++ plan: An expansion and expression of neoliberal 
and neoconservative tenets in state educational policy (Doctoral dissertation). 
Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3706265) 
Lauen, D. L., & Kozlowski, K. P. (2014). Performance incentives in North Carolina. 
Retrieved from the Consortium for Educational Research and Evaluation-North 
Carolina website https://publicpolicy.unc.edu/files/2015/07/Race-to-the-Top-
Performance-Incentives-in-North-Carolina-August-2014.pdf 
Lavania, M., Cohen-Vogel, L., & Lang, L. B. (2015). The Common Core State Standards 
initiative: An event history analysis of state adoption. American Journal of 
Education, 121(2), 145-182. doi:10.1086/679389 




statewide district survey. Journal of Educational Administration, 53(6), 702-717. 
doi:10.1108/JEA-09-2013-0106 
Loeb, S. (2013). How can value-added measures be used for teacher improvement. The 
Carnegie Knowledge Network. Retrieved from 
https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/CKN-Loeb_Teacher-Improvement.pdf 
Lowe, J. C. (2013). Assessment of teachers' reactions to a knowledge and skills-based 
pay structure at an international school (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). 
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA.  
Maranto, R. (2014). Tough teacher evaluation and high morale? Educational Leadership, 
71(5). 
Marsh, J. S. (2014). Performance-based pay: Perceptions of elementary teachers of the 
Pandora School District (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3680827) 
McCullough, M., English, B., Angus, M. H., & Gill, B. (2015). Alternative student 
growth measures for teacher evaluation: Implementation experiences of early-
adopting districts. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of 
Education Sciences, National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional 
Assistance, Regional Educational Laboratory Mid-Atlantic. Retrieved from 
http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/edlabs.  
Meier, K. J., & Rutherford, A. (2016). The politics of African-American education : 
Representation, partisanship, and educational equity. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press.  




Moss, P. A., & Haertel, E. H. (2016). Engaging methodological pluralism. In D. Gitomer 
and C. Bell (Eds), Handbook of research on teaching (5th Ed), (pp. 127-247). 
Washington, DC: AERA. 
Munroe, A. (2017). Measuring student growth within a merit-pay evaluation system: 
Perceived effects on music teacher motivation career commitment. Contributions 
to Music Education, 42, 89-105.  
Najera, T. L. (2017). Confirming predictors of rural teacher expectancy (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation). The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH.  
Nicol, A. A. M., & Pexman, P. M. (2010). Presenting your findings: A practical guide for 
creating tables. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Nieberg, A. J., Pieper, J. R., & Trevor, C. O. (2016). Pay-for-performance’s effect on 
future employee performance: Integrating psychological and economic principles 
toward a contingency perspective. Journal of Management, 42(7), 1753-1783. 
doi:10.1177/0149206313515520 
O’Connor, J. (2013). What the Florida teacher evaluation system lawsuit could mean for 
other states. Retrieved from State Impact Florida 
website:http://stateimpact.npr.org/florida/2013/05/15/what-the-florida-teacher-
evaluation-lawsuitcould-mean-for-other-states/ 
Olcum, D., & Titrek, O. (2015). The effect of school administrators’ decision-making 
styles on teacher job satisfaction. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 197, 
1936-1946. doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.07.575 
Olufowote, J. O. (2017). Limitations of research. In M. Allen (Ed.), The SAGE 




CA: Sage.  
Owens, J. (2013). Confessions of a bad teacher. Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks. 
Ozoemena, P. O. (2013). Improved incentive system in teaching profession as strategy 
for quality delivery and enhanced productivity in contemporary Nigeria. 
International Journal of Education and Research, 1(7), 1-12. 
Parijat, P., & Bagga, S. (2014). Victor vroom’s expectancy theory of motivation–an 
evaluation. International Research Journal of Business and Management, 7(9), 1-
8. 
Pemberton-Albright, M. M. (2011). The merit of merit pay (Doctoral dissertation). 
Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3453880)  
Pérez, M. E., & Pericchi, L. R. (2014). Changing statistical significance with the amount 
of information: The adaptive α significance level. Statistics & Probability 
Letters, 85, 20–24. doi:10.1016/j.spl.2013.10.018 
Perry, T. (2016), English value-added measures: Examining the limitations of school 
performance measurement. British Educational Research Journal, 42(6), 1056-
1080. doi:10.1002/berj.3247 
Pivovarova, M., Amrein-Beardsley, A., & Broatch, J. (2016). Value-added models 
(VAMs): Caveat emptor. Statistics and Public Policy, 3(1), 1-10. 
doi:10.1080/2330443X.2016.1164641  
Postal, L. (2017, May 8). Massive education bill alters testing, recess, teacher 






Pressley, T. M. F. (2015). Teachers view of the role VAM plays in their work in the 
school and school community (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3724350)  
Regmi, P. R., Waithaka, E., Paudyal, A., Simkhada, P., & van Teijlingen, E. (2016). 
Guide to the design and application of online questionnaire surveys. Nepal 
Journal of Epidemiology, 6(4), 640–644. doi:10.3126/nje.v6i4.17258 
Research Services, Dade County Public Schools, (2017). Retrieved from 
http://drs.dadeschools.net.  
Rice, J. K., Malen, B., Jackson, C., & Hoyer, K. M. (2015). Time to pay up: Analyzing 
the motivational of financial awards in a TIF program. Educational Evaluation 
and Policy Analysis, 37(1), 29-49. doi:10.3102/0162373714524622 
Ritter, G. W., & Jensen, N. C. (2010). The delicate task of developing an attractive merit 
pay plan for teachers. Phi Delta Kappan, 91(8), 32-37. 
doi:10.1177/003172171009100807 
Robertson-Kraft, C. (2014). Teachers’ motivational responses to new teacher 
performance management systems: An evaluation of the pilot of Aldine ISD’s 
inVEST system (Unpublished doctoral Dissertation). University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, PA.  
Robles, Y. (2015, July 27). Evolution of teacher evaluations is leading performance pay 
reforms. The Denver Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.denverpost.com/2015/07/27/evolution-of-teacher-evaluations-is-
leading-performance-pay-reforms/ 




heat? How low-performing schools respond to voucher and accountability 
pressure. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5(2), 251-281. 
doi:10.1257/pol.5.2.251 
Routh, J. B. (2014). Missouri teachers, administrators, superintendents’ perceptions of 
teacher performance pay (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3713984) 
Russ, R. D. (2015). Teacher attitudes regarding performance-based pay (Doctoral 
dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI 
No. 3707142)  
Sharma, G. (2017). Pros and cons of different sampling techniques. International Journal 
of Applied Research, 3(7), 749-752.  
Smith, C. (2018, March 19). Richardson ISD looks to Dallas for inspiration for its new 
turnaround program. Dallas News. Retrieved from 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/education/2018/03/19/richardson-isd-looks-
dallas-inspiration-new-turnaround-program 
Springer, M., & Winters, M. (2009). The NYC teacher pay-for-performance program: 
Early evidence from a randomized trial. Center for Civic Innovation at the 
Manhattan Institute. Retrieved from http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/pdf/cr_56.pdf   
Stephens, D. M. (2015). Mississippi teachers’ perception  of merit pay (Doctoral 
dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI 
No. 3733079) 




school system now says it doesn’t work. The Washington Post, 3-5. 
Stutz, T. (2013, October 13). Texas merit pay plan for teachers quietly disappears. Dallas 
Morning News. Retrieved from 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/localnews/20131013-texas-merit-pay-plan-for-
teachers-quietly-disappears.ece 
Suen, L. J., Huang, H. M., & Lee, H. H. (2014). A comparison of convenience sampling 
and purposive sampling. Hu Li Za Zhi, 61(3), 105-111. doi:10.622/JN.61.3.105 
Theofanidis, D., & Fountouki, A. (2019). Limitations and delimitations in the research 
process. Perioperative Nursing, 7(3), 155–162. doi:10.5281/zenodo.2552022 
Toch, T. (2016). Grading the graders: A report on teacher evaluation reform in public 
education. Retrieved from https://educationpost.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Thomas-Toch-Grading-the-Graders.pdf  
Tucson Unified School District. (2017). 301 pay for performance plan. Retrieved from 
https://www.nctq.org/dmsView/Tucson_301Plan17-18 
Umer, M., & Razi, S. (2018). Analyzing research methodologies and publication trends 
in service marketing literature. Cogent Business & Management, 5(1), 1-16. 
doi:10.1080/23311975.2018.1446265 
U.S. Department of Education. (2012). Race to the Top: Florida report.  Washington, 
DC:  U.S. Department of Education. 
U.S. Department of Education. (2016). Race to the top fund. Washington, DC:  U.S. 
Department of Education. Retrieved from 
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/index.html. 




Policy implications. The CEPI Education Law Newsletter, 15(2), 1-7. 
Viscardi, D. (2014). The teacher pay for performance phenomenon (Doctoral 
dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI 
No. 3667762) 
Vroom, V. H. (1964). Work and motivation. New York, NY:  Wiley. 
Warne, R. T. (2017). Statistics for the social sciences: A general linear model approach. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
Wells, P., Combs, J. P., & Bustamante, R. M. (2013). Team performance pay and 
motivation theory: A mixed methods study. Journal of Research in Education, 
23(2), 116-125. 
Wesson, L., Potts, K., & Hill, K. (2015). Use of value-added in teacher evaluations: Key 
concepts and state profile. Nashville, TN: Tennessee Comptroller of the Treasury, 
Office of Research and Education Accountability. Retrieved from 
http://www.comptroller.tn.gov/Repository/RE/ValueAdded2015.pdf 
Will, M. (2018). An instructional coach can improve school performance. Here’s proof. 
Education Week. Retrieved from 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/2018/02/in_tennessee_will_teacher_l
ead.html 
Yuan, K. V., Le, V., McCaffrey, D. F., Marsh, J. A., Hamilton, L. S., Stecher, B. M., & 
Springer, M. G. (2013). Incentive pay programs do not affect teacher motivation 
or reported practices: Results from three randomized studies. Educational 
















Teacher Perceptions of Performance Pay 
95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
 
 
